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WHAT TO DO WITH THE SHEEP IN WOLF'S CLOTHING: THE
ROLE OF RHETORIC AND REALITIYABOUT YOUTH OFFENDERS
IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISMANTLING OF THE
JUVENILEJUSTICE SYSTEM
SACHA M. COUPETi
Why is it notjust and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we deal
with the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles his
own child whose errors are not discovered by the authorities? Why is it
not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or a girl
has committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically, men-
tally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path that leads
to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to re-
form, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to
make him a criminal but a worthy citzen.
I
INTRODUCTION
In October 1998, at the close of the 105th Congress, Senator Pat-
rick Leahy, lamenting the failure of the Senate to pass juvenile crime
legislation, urged the majority leader to make this issue one of the top
legislative priorities in the 106th Congress.2 For better or for worse,
he got his wish. In the immediate wake of the April 1999 shooting in
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1 Julian W. Mack, TheJuvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909).
2 See 144 CoNG. REc. S12644-45 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(praising the bipartisan efforts at the end of the 105th Congress, but voicing concern
that the efforts came so late in the session and urging a quick completion in the be-
ginning of the next).
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Littleton, Colorado," the Senate and the House of Representatives
abruptly began to draft extensive juvenile justice reform measures.4
The massacre at Columbine High School was one of the worst epi-
sodes of school violence in U.S. history, and it, along with a number of
other killings by juveniles, confirmed the public's worst fears and dire
predictions concerning juvenile crime. For the federal government,
as it was for forty-seven states and the District of Columbia between
1992 and 1997,6 juvenile justice was once again at the top of the legis-
lative agenda. 7 The ongoing debate concerning juvenile justice re-
form at both the national and state levels is but another chapter in the
saga of an adjudicative arena that has been in flux since its inception
in 1899.8 Now, as the United States marks the 100th anniversary of
3 See Patrick O'Driscoll, Colorado Police Probing Whether Schoolyard Gunmen Had Help,
USA TODAY, Apr. 22, 1999, at IA (describing the investigation of the shooting in
Littleton, Colorado).
4 House Bill 1501, 106th Cong. (1999) and Senate Bill 254, 106th Cong. (1999)
were passed by the House and Senate, respectively, and are now in conference. Both
the House and Senate bills are aimed at increasing offender accountability through
various means, including implementation of graduated sanctions for juveniles, expan-
sion of correctional and detention facilities, see H.R. 1501, § 2, and lowering to 14 the
minimum age for federal prosecution of certain crimes, seeS. 254, § 102.
5 One year prior to the Columbine shooting, in March 1998, two boys, 11 and 13,
were arrested in Jonesboro, Arkansas for killing four classmates and a teacher and
wounding 10 others. See Brenda Warner Rotzoll, Kids Ambush Kids, Four Arkansas Girls
Die, Renewing Concern for School Safety, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25, 1998, at 1 (describing
the attack at an Arkansas middle school). Two months later, in Springfield, Oregon, a
15-year-old boy killed his parents and subsequently went on a shooting spree in his
high school, killing two classmates. See Brad Cain, Oregon Teen Arraigned in High School
Rampage, ORANGE COUNT'Y REG., June 17, 1998, at A18 (describing the shooting and
the arraignment).
HOWARD N. SNYDER & MEU2SSA SIcKMUND, NATIONAL Cmr. FORJUVENILEJUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFNDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999 NATIONAL REPORT 89 (1999) [hereinafter
NATIONAL REPORT] (noting that "[flrom 1992 though 1997, legislatures in 47 [s] tates
and the District of Columbia enacted laws that made their juvenile justice systems
more punitive").
7Continued impassioned debate from the floor of the House of Representatives
reflects the urgency of juvenile legislation. See 145 CONG. REC. H8595-96 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1999) (statement of Rep. McCarthy) (urging the committee of conference to
reach a compromise on the gun control provisions of the juvenile justice bill and stat-
ing that "[elvery day Congress fails to advancejuvenile justice legislation is another day
that we lose 13 children to gun violence").
8 See generally THOMASJ. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OFJUVENILE JUSTIcE 31-33 (1992)
(advancing the notion thatjuvenile justice reform has been longstanding and cyclical
in nature and that virtually every decade of this century has been marked with the fear
of rising rates ofjuvenile delinquency and crime). Note also the significant changes to
the juvenile court brought in with the Warren Court's "due process revolution." Re-
cent debate over reform has involved a range of views, from that advanced by Barry C.
Feld, who favors elimination of a separate juvenile justice system, see Barry C. Feld, The
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the creation of a separate system to address the actions of young of-
fenders, debate on how best to respond to juvenile crime continues.
At the extreme, abolitionists9 call for its demise, favoring instead the
trial ofjuveniles in adult criminal courts with sentences mitigated by
age or other offender variables. 10 Reformers propose altering the sys-
tem, sometimes beyond recognition, through "get tough" measures
including increasing the use of transfer waivers to try children in adult
court, lowering the minimum age for transfers, increasing the use of
detention and incarceration, and limiting confidentiality and ex-
pungement privileges." In the dawn of the new millennium, the ju-
venile justice system may have taken a step back into the nineteenth
century. Current juvenile reform measures that move greater num-
bers of juvenile offenders into adult criminal court, with increasingly
punitive sanctions for juveniles, harken back to pre-1899, when chil-
Transformation of theJuvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 723-24 (1991) (advocating for
the abolition of the juvenile court), to that advocated by Justice Lawrence Koontz of
the Supreme Court of Virginia, favoring preservation of the system, see Lawrence L.
Koontz, Jr., Reassessment Should Not Lead To Wholesale Rejection of the Juvenile Justice System,
31 U. RicH. L. REv. 179, 188-89 (1997) (cautioning against the eradication of thejuve-
nile justice system).
This Comment primarily addresses the juvenile delinquency component of the ju-
venile court; references to the juvenile court are intended to refer to delinquency, not
dependency, proceedings. Note also that this Comment focuses primarily on the way
in which the system responds to crimes against persons or property committed byju-
veniles as opposed to status offenses such as truancy or running away, or to situations
in which children have been brought before the juvenile court due to parental abuse
or neglect.
By "abolitionists," I am referring to the term Michael K. Burke applies to those
whose aim it is to dismantle the current juvenile court structure and incorporate chil-
dren into the adult criminal court system. See Michael Kennedy Burke, This Old Court:
Abolitionists Once Again Line Up the Wrecking Ball on the Juvenile Court When All It Needs Is a
Few Minor Alterations, 26 U. TOL L. REV. 1027, 1027-28 n.10 (1995) (defining "aboli-
tionist" as used in his article).
10 See Feld, supra note 8, at 723 (favoring the abolition of the juvenile court and
asserting the futility of reform). Feld notes that "[c]oupling the emergence of punitive
policies with our societal unwillingness to provide for the welfare of children in gen-
eral, much less to those who commit crimes, there is simply no reason to believe that
the juvenile court can be rehabilitated." Id. at 723.
41 House Bill 3, 105th Cong. (1997) was passed in May 1997, but was not enacted,
and would have advanced all of these punitive measures. See 143 CONG. REC. H5384-85
(daily ed. July 16, 1997) (statement of Rep. Stupak) (criticizing H.R. 3 for mandating
trying 15-year-old children as adults, transferring 14-year-old children to adult courts,
and increasing the number of children locked up as adults); see also T. Markus Funk, A
Mere Youthful Indiscretionf Reexamining the Policy ofExpungingJuvenile Delinquency Records,
29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885 (1996) (advocating the limiting of the use of expunge-
ment statutes in many situations to ensure a complete picture of the youth offender);
Koontz, supra note 8, at 180-81 (highlighting radical juvenile justice reform measures
and advocating for temperance instead).
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dren were tried in the same courts of law as adults and received simi-
lar forms of punishment served in the same adult penal institutions,
houses of refuge, or other correctional facilities. At that time, be-
yond the common law's substantive infancy defense that only relieved
children under the age of seven of culpability, "neither statute nor
court decision provided for treating children charged with crimes dif-
ferently from adults, substantively or procedurally."' s
Reformers in the early juvenile court movement constituted a
group of advocates who, understanding the needs and circumstances
of young offenders, pressed for the development of an entirely sepa-
rate adjudicative system that rested on the notion that 'juveniles are
different.' 4 Those reformers uniformly favored rehabilitation and
treatment over punishment as the most effective means of dealing
with juvenile delinquents. 5 Today, the most vocal group of reformers
call for increasingly more punitive measures that threaten to putjuve-
nile offenders on par with adult criminals. These reformers' success-
ful legislative efforts have nearly drowned out the call of those who
press for innovative rehabilitative and preventive programs. The
dominant theme of contemporary juvenile justice reform indeed
strikes a different note from the traditional wholly rehabilitative phi-
losophy of the original juvenile court.16 A drive to punish young of-
12 Placement in detention facilities remains the "program of choice" for juvenile
offenders "[d]espite the rehabilitative paradigm's symbolic goal to protect youths."
SUSAN GUARINO-GHEZZI & EDWARD J. LOUGHRAN, BALANCINGJUVENILE JUSTICE 9-10
(1996).
is SanfordJ. Fox, The Early History of the Court, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Winter 1996,
at 31; see also NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 86 (noting that "[t]hroughout the late
eighteenth century... children as young as 7... could stand trial in criminal court...
and, if found guilty, could be sentenced to prison or even to death"). At common law
in Pennsylvania, for example, children under 7 years of age were conclusively pre-
sumed incapable of committing crimes. For those 7 to 14, however, this presumption
could be rebutted by evidence that the child understood the wrongfulness of his or her
act. For a child 14 years and above, the presumption of incapacity was generally un-
available. See Barbara Margaret Farrell, Pennsylvania's Treatment of Children Who Commit
Murder Criminal Punishment Has Not ReplacedParens Patriae, 98 DICE. L. REV. 739, 741-
42 (1994) (describing common law treatment of children).
14 David Yellen, The EnduringDifference of Youth, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 999 (1999).
15 See GuARINo-GHEZzi & LOUGHRAN, supra note 12, at 5-6 (describing the liberal
or "progressive" view that shaped the eariyjuvenile court, marked by a de-emphasis on
offenses and an emphasis on treatment and on the rehabilitative needs of young of-
fenders).
16 See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THEJUVENILE
COURT 14 (1999) (stating that get tough policies and the retributive philosophy ad-
vanced by some legislators may erase differences between children and adults by sen-
tencing "transferred youths under the same laws and to the same facilities as they sen-
tence other adult offenders"); see also BERNARD, supra note 8, at 162 (noting that "[t]he
RETORTC, REALZ, ANDJUVEILEJUSTICE
fenders for their supposed increasingly violent behavior has guided
reform measures over the past three decades and has steered the ju-
venile justice system from rehabilitative to retributive aims. 7 The
general public's concern about perceived increases in youth criminal
activity "bolster policies to repress rather than rehabilitate young of-
fenders.",8 Despite the fact that "many knowledgeable criminologists
have seen little evidence of a profound difference in the rate of seri-
ous crime among adolescents over the past thirty years,"19 rhetoric
about explosions in juvenile crime rates and "a coming wave of juve-
nile 'superpredators'" continues to fuel the public's hysteria.20 Rather
than educating their constituents about the complex nature of youth
crime and the juvenile justice system's limited ability to reduce it,
"politicians propose simplistic 'get tough' policies and pander to peo-
ple's fears."2' Even in the face of valid social science research indicat-
ing that a retributive "just desserts" response-a core tenet of the
adult criminal system-is not the most effective long-term interven-
tion to reduce or prevent juvenile crime,2 the reform rhetoric is re-
plete with calls for retribution, punishment, and confinement.J
Part I of this Comment addresses the historical origins of the ju-
'get tough' movement has proposed the idea that juvenile delinquents are hardened
criminals").
17 SeeYellen, supra note 14, at 996 ("ET]he juvenile court has survived by becoming
more overtly punitive. More young people than ever are being transferred to adult
courts, and more punitive sentences are imposed on those youths who remain in the
juvenile court."); see also KATHLEEN M. HEIDE, YOUNG KILLERS: THE CHALENGE OF
JUvENILE HOMICIDE 21 (1999) (describing federal and state legislative efforts to get
tough on crime, including lowering the age of majority or making it easier to tryjuve-
niles in adult criminal court); ANNE L. SCHNEIrDER, DETERRENCE ANDJUVENILE CRIME 1
(1990) (noting changes in juvenile justice "toward more punishment-oriented policies
for juvenile offenders). In noting the punitive effect of recent juvenile legislation,
Heide states that "[i]n some states today, ... youths as young as 13 years old can be
tried in adult court for any crime." HEDE, supra, at 21. Those convicted of adult
crimes could receive "longer periods of incarceration, life without parole, or (in some
cases) the death penalty." Id.
18 FELD, supra note 16, at 287.
19 JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE SysTEM 40 (1996).
20 Yellen, supra note 14, at 998.
SFELD, supra note 16, at 287.
2See infra Part IIA.1 (discussing the lack of consistent deterrent effects of punitive
measures on youths).
"See infra Part II (discussing statutes that move the juvenile court substantively
and procedurally closer to adult criminal courts); see also Michele M.Jochner, An Over-
view of thejuvenileJustice Reform Provisions of 1998, 87 ILL. B.J. 152 (1999) (summarizing
changes in Illinois state juvenile legislation including terminology, use of waivers, and
extendedjurisdiction ofjuvenile prosecutions).
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venilejustice system, highlighting the goals and original intent of this
adjudicative system: to be sensitive to the needs and capacities of
children. Part II examines state and federal juvenile crime legislation
spurred by "get tough" rhetoric and its actual and potential effects on
juvenile crime. Part III analyzes the role that public perception has
played in creating a cyclical response to juvenile delinquency
throughout history. It also examines sources of information and mis-
information relied upon by "get tough" reformers, and presents em-
pirical social science evidence that both debunks "get tough" rhetoric
and also supports alternatives to incarceration. Part IV presents a
model of restorative justice as an alternative to purely retributive or
purely rehabilitative aims.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF TEJUVENLEJUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Parens Patriae
The earliest development of the child welfare system, prior to the
juvenile justice model, was based on the parens patriae doctrine. This
concept generally refers to the role of the state as the custodian of
persons who suffer from some form of legal disability. It authorizes
the state to substitute and enforce its judgment about what it believes
to be in the best interests of the persons who presumably are unable
to take care of themselves. The parens patriae doctrine "refers tradi-
tionally to [the] role of [the] state as sovereign and guardian of per-
sons under a legal disability... [and focuses on] the principle that
the state must care for those who cannot take care of themselves."
2 4
This doctrine provides the basis for state laws that protect, rather than
punish, citizens.
Although the parens patriae doctrine was initially used to protect
the interests of minors, establish guardianships, or provide for the in-
voluntary commitment of the mentally ill, it was rarely invoked to take
control of or confine persons who had not committed a crime. In
1838, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the use of
the parens patriae doctrine to detain a minor for the purposes of re-
form and rehabilitation in Ex parte Crouse.2 Although she was not
found guilty of any crime, Mary Ann Crouse was committed to the
Philadelphia House of Refuge based upon her mother's complaint
24 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted).
2 4Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838).
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that she was beyond her control. 6
Despite the habeas corpus petition and Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge regarding Mary Ann's right to trial by jury filed on her behalf by
her father, Mary Ann was incarcerated and detained. Basing its hold-
ing on the parens patriae doctrine, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that the Constitution did not protect a minor from being con-
fined against his or her wishes because the goal of detention was ref-
ormation and rehabilitation, not punishment. The court reasoned
that there was no prohibition on restraints imposed for a child's own
27welfare. Crouse was the first reported case in which confinement for
the protection, not punishment, of minors was justified by a best in-
terests rationale and the power invested in the state by virtue of the
parens patriae doctrine.2s Moreover, Crouse became the precedent for
upholding juvenile commitments without the legal formalities and
due process protections of a criminal trial.2
Sixty years passed before the protection versus punishmentjustifl-
cation for juvenile confinement prompted the creation of an entirely
separate system for juvenile offenders. The pares patriae doctrine that
originated in English chancery courts provided a theoretical justifica-
tion for nonpunitive, yet coercive, intervention in the lives of children
and families.30 By applying the parens patriae doctrine to children and
adolescents who had committed acts that, were they adults, would be
considered criminal, judges were given broad discretion to take "up
the burden of parenthood and [stand] between all children and the
manifest dangers of parental laxness and urban temptation."'" Reha-
bilitation, over punishment, was intended to resemble the way in
which a benevolent parent would care for his or her own child and to
protect the child from the vices of crime.
In the context of demographic, social, and economic changes of
2 See BERNARD, supra note 8, at 68 (stating that Mary Ann Crouse's mother filed
the complaint, and that Mary Ann was growing up to be a pauper).
27 See Crouse, 4 Whart. at 11-12 (stating the facts of the case and holding that Mary
Ann was taken from a course that would have ended in depravity, and that there was
no constitutional provision against restraining a child for her welfare).
See Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Refonm" An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1187, 1205 (1970) (stating that Crouse has served as the precedent for the twenti-
eth-century view thatjuvenile courts do not need traditional legal formalities).
SeeFox, supra note 13, at 82 (describing Crouseas "the first reported case uphold-
ing the Refuge scheme").
SeeFELD, supra note 16, at 52 (explaining that this doctrine originated in English
chancery courts to ensure feudal succession).
1 ROBERT H. MNOOMIN & D. KELLYWEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILYAND STATE 1097 (3d
ed. 1995).
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the early nineteenth century, the social construction of childhood was
"institutionalized . . .as a period of dependency and exclusion from
the adult world." 2 Reformers regarded dependent, neglected, and
especially delinquent youth as malleable objects requiring protection
from corrupting influences, particularly poverty, poor home and
neighborhood conditions, and misguided or flawed parenting. This
social construction of childhood, coupled with fears of incipient pau-
perism, led to the development of formal social control efforts, such
as houses of refuge.3  Poor children of immigrant parents, the dis-
proportionate objects of such social control, were committed to
houses of refuge under the belief that only by "removing them from
evil influences" could reformers change these "deviants.'
Since no formal juvenile court existed to distinguish between de-
pendent and delinquent cases, either substantively or procedurally,
only informal attempts were made to handle children facing aban-
donment and dependency issues differently from those whose law-
breaking behaviors elicited a more punitive response. By the mid-
nineteenth century, certain child-saving efforts were implemented to
provide an alternative for some orphaned or neglected children, as
distinct from those deemed delinquent
3 6
3 FELD, supra note 16, at 44. According to Professor Feld, "childhood and adoles-
cence constitute social constructs or cultural artifacts [that are influenced by] social,
historical, and cultural contingencies." Id. at 17. Such contingencies during the early
nineteenth century included the development of an urban industrial society which, in
turn, altered the structure and function of families and created a divide between both
work and home and between adult responsibilities and children's pursuits. Children
were "encapsulated... within their families and in organizations of formal social con-
trol." Id. at44.
See Candace Zierdt, The Little Engine That Arrived at the Wrong Station: How to Get
Juvenile Justice Back on the Right Track, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 401, 405 (1999). Professor
Zierdt notes that repression of the impoverished, particularly immigrants, motivated
the development of child saving efforts. She states that since poverty and crime were
regarded as interchangeable, the placement of children in houses of refuge was based
on a belief that, if left to live in poverty, these children would become "tomorrow's
criminals." Id.
FELD, supra note 16, at 36 (noting the efforts of Progressive reformers "to
'Americanize,' assimilate and acculturate immigrants and the poor to become sober,
virtuous, middle-class Americans like themselves").
35 Id. at 50.
See Jeanne F. Cook, A Histoiy of Placing-Out: The Orphan Trains, 74 CHILD
WELFARE 181, 182-84 (describing the history of the early child welfare movement, es-
pecially that of the Children's Aid Society and distinctions in the treatment of depend-
ent and delinquent children). See generally Fox, supra note 13, at 32 (discussing "alter-
native placements for destitute and neglected children," but noting that "the typical
practice of this era was to treat poor and/or neglected children and young criminals as
a homogeneous group").
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Charles Loring Brace and the Children's Aid Society, for example,
made efforts to "place-out" noncriminal youth, shipping them from
those crowded, unsafe, urban areas that were perceived to be the
breeding ground of "environmental corruption," to families living in
rural America. Furthermore, to approximate the home and family-
like settings made available to orphaned and neglected children, re-
formatories were established to further the efforts, begun in the
houses of refuge, to rehabilitate delinquent youth.Y The houses of
refuge, and later reform schools, precursors to modem juvenile de-
tention facilities, embodied some of the early goals of the juvenile sys-
tem that had yet to be formally established: (1) segregation of youth
from adult criminals, (2) rehabilitation as a goal, and (3) the restric-
tion of this system to children regarded as amenable to treatment. 9
Placing-out dependent children only proved workable for a lim-
ited time.4 1 Similarly, by the mid- to late-nineteenth century, houses of
refuge and reformatories fell into disfavor, as they "had become little
more than custodial warehouses."41 A minor's stay in these places of
confinement was essentially indefinite, either until he or she reached
majority or was "reformed" as determined by the reform school offi-
cial.4 "Growing doubt about the success of reform schools in reduc-
ing delinquency led some to question the wisdom of applying an un-
limited parens patriae doctrine to youth." 4 In response to the growing
concern, in 1870 the Illinois Supreme Court held it unconstitutional
to continue to order children who had not been formally charged
with an offense or had not been accorded due process at trial to
houses of refuge or reform schools.44 Cases such as Turner led judges
37 FEL, supra note 16, at 49.
3 See iU. at 54 (stating that penologists developed the reformatories to "shelter and
reform young deviants").
39 See Fox, supra note 13, at 30 (noting the goals and basic principles of operation
of 19th-century institutions forjuvenile offenders).
40 See Cook, supra note 36, at 187 (noting reasons offered for the demise of the
placing-out program, including "the initiation of new ways of coping with industrializa-
tion, the recognition of environmental factors as causes for some social problems, and
the reforms of the Progressive Era, including compulsory school attendance and child
labor laws").
41 FELD, supranote 16, at 55.
42 BARRY KRISBERG & JAMES F. AusT-N, REINVENTnNGJUVENLE JUsTICE 24 (1993)
(noting that the age of majority was 21 for boys and 18 for girls and that the length of
confinementwas the decision of reform school officials).
43 Id. at 29.
44 See Illinois ex rel O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ii. 280, 287 (1870) (holding that chil-
dren should not lose their liberty without due process). The court also noted that the
state could interfere with parental custody only upon proof of "gross misconduct or
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and the public to question the quasi-penal character of reform institu-
tions for youth and to challenge the lack of procedural safeguards in
the process of making placement decisions. 5
By the end of the nineteenth century, progressive reformers in
Cook County, Illinois were successful in enacting juvenile legislation
that set the stage for the development of a distinctly separate juvenile
justice system. The parens patriae philosophy, once invoked to confine
children to houses of refuge and reformatories, was now extended to
the entire court process.46 While it did not establish an independent
judicial structure for handling cases of dependent, neglected, and de-
linquent children, the 1899 Illinois Juvenile Court Act47 articulated a
set of rules specifically governing the treatment and control of "de-
pendent, neglected and delinquent children."8 According to the leg-
islation, "the court may, for convenience, be called the 'Juvenile
Court.' 49  The rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court was
widely embraced, and by 1925, all but two states had enacted similar
legislation.50
Judge Julian W. Mack, one of Illinois's first juvenile court judges,
noted that the role of the juvenile court judge was to replace, for all
intents and purposes, the parent who was no longer able to ade-
quately raise the child in question.51 Using broad discretion, the juve-
nile court judge was to provide the necessary help and guidance to a
young person who might otherwise proceed further down the path of
chronic crime.52 Again relying on the parens patriae doctrine, disposi-
tions or interventions by the juvenile court focused on the absence of
appropriate parental models and the resulting effects on the child,
rather than on his or her inappropriate conduct. A certain level of
presumed innocence was therefore accorded the children who en-
almost total unfitness on the part of the parent." Id.
See KRISBERG & AUSTrIN, supra note 42, at 28 (noting cases that led judges to
wonder whether there should be procedural safeguards for children charged with de-
linquency).'. See id. at 30 (discussing the extension of the parenspatiaedoctrine).
47 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
48 KRISBERG & AUSTIN, supra note 42, at 30.
49 1899 Ill. Laws 131, § 3.
50 See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 86 (discussing the establishment ofjuve-
nile courts and their notion of rehabilitation).
51 See Mack, supra note 1, at 107 (discussing "the thought that the child ... is taken
in hand by the state ... because [of] either the unwillingness or inability of the natural
parents").
52 See Fox, supra note 13, at 35 ("The social responsibility for reforming chil-
dren.., became.., the quintessential function ofjuvenile courts.").
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tered the juvenile court system. Questions of capacity or culpability as
to the delinquent conduct remained relatively insignificant in devising
a disposition focused on treatment and rehabilitation, as had been the
case in youth commitments to houses of refuge and reformatories. In
fact, Professor Feld notes that indeed the "earlier generations of ref-
uge and reformatory innovators formulated most of the elements" of
the newjuvenile court.
53
The underlying assumption of the original juvenile system, and
one that continues to prevail despite attack, was that juveniles were
generally more amenable to rehabilitation than adult criminals. They
did not merit adult punishments because essentially "kids are differ-
ent.' 5" Thus, the rehabilitative aims of the juvenile justice system ex-
isted wholly apart from the seriousness of the offense or the determi-
nation of guilt or innocence. The inquiry during trial accorded
minimal significance to the offense committed by the juvenile, as it
was believed to indicate little about the child's real needs. At hearings
and dispositions, the court directed its attention first and foremost to
the child's character and lifestyle.5  Since children could not be held
responsible for the life circumstances in which they were raised, how-
ever, retributive responses aimed at punishing them for their illegal
acts did not appear warranted.6 Fundamentally, the purpose and
functioning of the juvenile court embodied the broad societal "inter-
est in rehabilitating alljuvenile delinquents, irrespective of the nature
of their delinquent acts,""
The focus on rehabilitation and on the broad discretion granted
to juvenile court judges had both positive and negative consequences
for the adjudicative process:
[S] ince the underlying justification was prevention, not punishment,
proof that a youth in fact committed a particular crime was traditionally
thought less relevant than the youth's need for rehabilitation; judges
were given broad discretion with regard to dispositions; and the length
of the sentences was typically indeterminate, so that "treatment" could
3FED, supra note 16, at 55.
5 Id. at 6.
55 See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 825 (1988) ('Juvenile court
proceedings concentrated on the child's background and welfare rather than the de-
tails surrounding the commission of a specific crime.").
56 See id. at 900 (noting thatsociety is partially at fault for children's offenses).
57 Andrew D. Roth, Note, An Examination of Whether Incarcerated Juveniles Are Entitled
by the Constitution to Rehabilitative Treatment; 84 MIcH. L. REv. 286, 296 (1985).
20001 1313
1314 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1303
continue so long as it was thought appropriate.5
Given the broad discretion granted to judges, juvenile proceed-
ings and outcomes for children risked being heavily influenced by the
temperament and generosity of a particular judge.9 Two natural con-
sequences of such a flexible and discretionary process were disparities
in juvenile sentencing and the loss of due process protections af-
forded adults in criminal courts.
B. Due Process Protections at a Cost
Since its inception, critics have raised concerns about the lack of
procedural protections for children adjudicated in the juvenile justice
systemic With its open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies
designed to address the rehabilitative needs of each child who comes
before the juvenile court judge, critics saw the court as failing to af-
ford juveniles the procedural parity and constitutional safeguards
available in general criminal court proceedings. Failure to apply con-
stitutional protections to juvenile proceedings was justified under the
"legal fiction" of protective confinement and rehabilitation instead of
criminal punishment. Since children were being treated and not pun-
ished through the court's intervention and since the court was func-
tioning in the capacity of a loving and responsible parent, the chil-
dren whom it was treating were not believed to be in need of formal
61due process protections. Critics asserted that such a system only
harmed children by denying them necessary constitutional protec-
tions and by exposing them to the risk ofjudicial whim.
Four critical Supreme Court cases marked the beginning of a wave
of juvenile justice reform that restricted the power and discretion of
juvenile courtjudges and marked the boundaries of the constitutional
due process protections available to juveniles.62 Kent v. United States
58 MNOOIN & WESBERG, supra note 31, at 1081.
59 See Fox, supra note 13, at 36 (noting concerns over "having the effectiveness of
the court depend so much on the personality of the judge").
60 See Feld, supra note 55, at 826-31 (discussing a series of Supreme Court decisions
that emphasized "procedural regularity in the determination of criminal guilt as a pre-
requisite to a delinquency disposition").
61 SeeJeanne Asherman-Jusino, The Right of Children in the Juvenile Justice System to
Inclusion in the Federally Mandated Child Welfare Services System, 3 D.C. L. REV. 311, 324
(1995) ("Because the children were being helped and not punished.., they did not
need formal due process protections.").
62 The cases cited in the text are by no means exhaustive. Following the four
landmark decisions handed down during the Warren Court's "due process revolution,"
subsequent Supreme Court cases have further defined the scope of constitutional
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began a period of re-analysis of the juvenile justice system, focusing on
the unconstitutionality of ajudicially determined juvenile transfer into
the adult criminal system.6 Morris KentJr., a sixteen-year-old charged
with rape and robbery, was waived into adult criminal court and sen-
tenced to thirty to ninety years in prison without a transfer hearing.
The Court struck down the waiver, stating that Kent was entitled to
"the essentials of due process and fair treatment"64 which would have
included a transfer hearing and an opportunity for Kent to challenge
the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction. The Court's decision in
Kent challenged the constitutionality of the parens patriae doctrine as
the justification for both punitive and rehabilitative juvenile court in-
tervention. According to the Court, "the child receives the worst of
both worlds... he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for chil-
dren."6 What he or she does receive is essentially punishment in the
form of a deprivation of his or her liberty without due process of law.
In the landmark case of In re Gault,6 the Supreme Court again
highlighted the dangers inherent in permitting ajudge's parens patriae
role to justify a lack of procedural due process safeguards. After only
an informal adjudication hearing, Gerald Gault, a fifteen-year-old
charged with making obscene phone calls, was committed to a juve-
nile correctional facility for an indefinite period not to extend beyond
his twenty-first birthday. In the hearing, Gault was not afforded essen-
tial procedural protections including representation by counsel, an
rights available to youth in juvenile proceedings. Procedural parity between juvenile
court and adult court, however, threatens to blur key distinctions between them. See,
e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that a state's use of age 16
as the minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty does not violate the
Eighth Amendment); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of New York's preventive detention statute and reasserting the parens patriae
interests of the state in promoting the welfare of children); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979) (holding that a state cannot punish the publication of
an alleged juvenile delinquent's name legally obtained from a source outside the
court); Oklahoma Publ'g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977) (holding
that a court order barring the press from publishing a legally obtained photograph of
a youth involved in juvenile proceedings is an unconstitutional infringement upon the
freedom of the press); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975) (holding that the
prosecution of the minor respondent as an adult, following findings in juvenile court
that he had violated a criminal statute and was unfit for treatment as an adult, consti-
tutes double jeopardy); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding
thataury trials are not constitutionally required in juvenile court proceedings).
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
6 Id. at 562.
z Id. at 556 (citation omitted).
66 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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opportunity to question witnesses or confront his accuser, and protec-
tion against self-incrimination. Gault received an extremely harsh
sentence based only on the account of the recipient of the obscene
calls; had he been an adult at the time, Gault would have received
only a maximum sentence of sixty days in jail or a fifty-dollar fine.6
Again registering displeasure with the informality of the juvenile court
process and its reliance on the doctrine of parens patiae, the Court
held that, although the juvenile court may have intended benevolent
intervention, denying children the basic due process protections is
unconstitutional.9
Three years later, the Court's decision in In re Winship imposed a
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt-the standard of
proof required in adult criminal prosecutions-for the juvenile court
conviction of delinquent acts. 7 In Winship, ajuvenile was found guilty
of stealing money from a woman's purse based on a preponderance of
evidence standard.7' As commentators have noted, the Supreme
Court reasoned that "when a youth's liberty is at stake, due process
required that the standard of evidence necessary for conviction be as
exacting as that applied in adult proceedings. "72
As a result of Kent, Gault, and Winship, basic due process protec-
tions were extended to juveniles charged with delinquent behavior,
including the right to counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination;
the privilege against self-incrimination;7 and a standard of proof on
67 See id. at 4-8 (describing the circumstances of Gault's appearance before ajuve-
nile courtjudge).
63 See id. at 8-9 (noting the Arizona Criminal Code's provisions for persons who "in
the presence or hearing of any woman or child. .. uses vulgar, abusive or obscene lan-
guage"). The Court also mentions that, in response to Gault's mother's request that
the woman who received the phone call be present at the hearing, the judge re-
sponded that "she didn't have to be present at the hearing." Id. at 7.
69 See id. at 18 ("Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled dis-
cretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle
and4 ,ractice.").
397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) ("[T]he constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is as much required during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency
proceeding as are those constitutional safeguards applied in Gault).71 See id. at 360 (noting the adjudicating court's reliance on a New York statutory
provision requiring only a preponderance of evidence).
BARRY NURCOMBE & DAVID F. PARTLETT, CHLD IMENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAw
276 (1994) (discussing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 365 ("The same considerations that
demand extreme caution in fact finding to protect the innocent adult apply as well to
the innocent child.")).
73 Asherman-Jusino, supra note 61, at 325 (discussing the procedural protections
applied in Gault).
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par with that required for the conviction and confinement of adult
criminals. 4 While the due process guarantees secured by these and
subsequent cases appear to have provided safeguards for children who
enter the juvenile justice system, critics argue that the reforms have
made the juvenile court "more formalized, legalistic, and adversarial"
75
at best and a "scaled-down second-class criminal court for young peo-
ple"76 at worst. Despite the efforts to reconcile judicial discretion with
due process rights, conflict between these interests continues to pres-
ent a public policy dilemma."7
II. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS To ADDRESSJUVENILE VIOLENT CRIME
Contemporary abolitionists seek to reform the juvenile justice sys-
tem by addressing, among others, two primary concerns: (1) due pro-
cess protections that, although substantially ameliorated since the ju-
venile court's inception, still do not provide adequate safeguards for
young offenders, and (2) insufficient consequences for young offend-
ers who commit adult-like offenses." This Part focuses on recent legis-
lative responses to the latter concern and addresses the potential ef-
fects of "get tough" initiatives that shift the court from treatment to
punishment.
A. State Legislation
With regard to legislative reform of juvenile justice, state statutes
understandably provide a more comprehensive response to juvenile
crime than those proposed on the federal level. Consistent with the
ideals of federalism,juvenilejustice, along with other areas of criminal
law, remains primarily within the purview of individual states to regu-
late. Following the 1994 peak in juvenile violent crime, several states
74 Koontz, supra note 8, at 187 (discussing the Court's application of the reason-
able doubt standard in Winship).
Carol S. Stevenson et al., The Juvenile Court: Analysis and Recommendations,
FUTURE OF CHmDREN, Winter 1996, at 10.
76 FED, supra note 16, at 287.
See BERNARD, supra note 8, at 136 (noting the divergent costs and benefits of
providing due process protections on one hand and allowingjudicial discretion on the
other).
78 See Burke, supra note 9, at 1029 (discussing the reasons cited by abolitionists for
eradicating the juvenile court system); see also Larry R. Abrahamson, The Need to Get
Back to Basics inJuvenile Justice, 33 PROSECUTOR 28, 30 (1999) (advancing a "get tough"
approach in stating that "[tihose who have developed a liking for antisocial behav-
ior... must also be presented with a 'fear factor' only with added teeth").
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enacted sweeping changes in their juvenile crime bills. In the context
of substantially elevated fear regarding increases in juvenile crime and
backlash against the perceived failure of the rehabilitative model,7 9
almost all states responded to the public concern by passing harsher
and more punitive reform measures. While on their face state meas-
ures appear to place an equal emphasis on the three interventions of
public safety, accountability, and competency development, in prac-
tice they favor societal protection and personal accountability over re-
habilitation. "Some laws removed certain classes of offenders from
the juvenile justice system and handled them as adult criminals in
criminal court. Others required the juvenile justice system to be more
like the criminal justice system and to treat certain classes ofjuvenile
offenders as criminals but in juvenile court."0 By and large, the most
radical measures enacted by the majority of states81 occurred in three
areas: transfer provisions; sentencing authority; and confidentiality
provisions.8
1. Transfer Provisions
One way in which "get tough" advocates have supported a merger
between the adult criminal and juvenile systems is by expanding the
scope of transfer provisions or waivers that bring children under the
jurisdiction of the adult criminal system. While waivers are not new,
they have been highlighted as a means of getting tough on crime, a
politically popular mantra for at least the past twenty years. Juveniles
can end up in adult criminal court through one of three waivers: leg-
islative or statutory exclusion, prosecutorial waiver, or judicial waiver.
Legislative exclusions involve state and federal statutes that automati-
cally exclude certain types of crimes or chronic offenders from juve-
nile courtjurisdiction. Legislative waivers make transfer automatic in
thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia. Prosecutorial waivers
permit prosecutors in some states to exercise discretion by directly fil-
ing certain cases in either juvenile or adult criminal court. In ten
states and the District of Columbia, prosecutorial waivers are used to
79 See infra Part llI.A (discussing the cyclical nature ofjuvenile justice and predic-
tions based on Bernard's cycle that came to pass in the state reforms enacted in the
mid-1990s).
80 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 88.
81 See id. at 89 (noting that between 1992 and 1997, all but three states changed
laws to make theirjuvenilejustice systems more punitive).
82 See id. (noting that changes in the juvenile justice system occurred primarily in
these three areas).
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transfer children to adult criminal court. Judicial waivers permit ju-
venile courtjudges to transfer cases to adult criminal court following a
transfer hearing. Judicial discretion has been exceedingly curtailed as
the list of statutory exclusions and the discretion of the prosecutorial
waivers have expanded. Between 1992 and 1995, forty states and the
District of Columbia restricted their juvenile court jurisdiction in a va-
riety of ways, including expanding legislative and prosecutorial waivers
while restricting juvenile court jurisdiction.83 Where judicial discre-
tion is employed, the judge may consider broad criteria in assessing
whether a juvenile should remain or be transferred to adult criminal
court. All criteria are aimed at assessing a juvenile's amenability to
treatment within the juvenile system and the juvenile's ability to bene-
fit from treatment services rather than punishment and confine-
ment.84
There are several dangers inherent in each of the waiver ap-
proachesss A particular risk of prosecutorial waivers is that "[a]
prosecutor's decision to file a case directly in adult criminal court is
made unilaterally without the benefit of a hearing where defense
counsel and probation officials can provide important information
about the juvenile in question. "ss Critics of transfer waivers raise the
concern that, due to political pressures, legislators and prosecutors, as
83 See Stevenson et al., supra note 75, at 9 (stating that between 1992 and 1995, 40
states changed their laws to restrictjuvenile courtjurisdiction).
See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(a) (4) (iii) (A) (West 1982) (listing the
criteria used by judges in determining amenability to treatment in a transfer motion
hearing in Pennsylvania, including- (1) age; (2) mental capacity; (3) maturity, (4) de-
gree of criminal sophistication; (5) previous records; (6) nature and extent of any
prior delinquent history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts to
rehabilitate the child; (7) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the expira-
tion ofJuvenile Courtjurisdiction; (8) probational or institutional reports; (9) nature
and circumstances of the acts for which the transfer is sought; and (10) any other rele-
vant factors). No further guidance is outlined within the statute to determine exactly
how the factors should be weighted.
Problems with waivers in some jurisdictions include lack of funding for services
needed in transfer hearings, denial of services to youth waived into the adult system,
and delays in the adult criminal system. As to the funding matter, clients who do not
have resources to pay for outside evaluators may have difficulty proving amenability to
treatment to ajudge during a transfer hearing. In addition, critical treatment and re-
habilitative services are not available until the matter ofjurisdiction is resolved, some-
times for a period of up to six months. Particularly problematic for youth and defense
attorneys are the long delays inherent in the adult criminal system. While the juvenile
system provides for hearings within 10 days of being taken into custody, the adult sys-
tem provides no such guarantees. Telephone Interview with David Rosen, Juvenile
Special Defense Unit, Defender's Association of Philadelphia (Nov. 12, 1998).
Stevenson et al., supra note 75, at 9-10.
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compared to non-elected judges, may institute purely reactionary
measures in response to the demands of their constituencies. The
"politicization" of crime appears to have forged an unbreakable link
between the mercurial nature and often inaccurate rhetoric of public
opinion, the desire to garner votes, and the resulting juvenile justice
policy.8 In states where judges are elected, political pressures may
prompt similarly motivated biases in judicial waiver decisions."'
Reformers who call for harsher treatment of juvenile offenders,
including increased use of criminal waivers, adult prosecution for a
wider range of violent offenses, and confinement for even minor
status offenses, such as truancy or running away, appear to adhere to a
yet unproven belief in the deterrent effect of such policies and prac-
tices$' Supporters of a rehabilitation-focused system are quick to
point out the lack of efficacy of the deterrence theory as it applies to
juvenile offenders. In her critique of the misplaced faith in harsh ju-
venile reform, Professor Zeirdt analyzes two studies comparing the
treatment ofjuvenile offenders in juvenile versus adult criminal court.
One study found that "juveniles were more likely to be found guilty of
the same or similar crime in juvenile court than in adult court."" The
second study found that juveniles transferred to adult court for prop-
erty offenses tended to receive more lenient sentences than those or-
dered by juvenile courts.91 In some cases, transfers may fail to achieve
the aim of punishing juveniles more severely and are therefore un-
likely to have the desired deterrent effect.92 Even in the face of evi-
87 See WIIAMJ. CHAMBLISS, POWER, POLTCS, AND CRImE 46 (1999) (noting that
"[p]anic over youth crime is... like so many other alarms, ... based on political and
law enforcement propaganda, not facts"); see also infra Part IH.A. (noting the role of
politics in the reporting ofjuvenile crime statistics).
88 SeetR.D, supra note 16, at 217 (noting that, in reference tojuvenile courtjudges,
"organizational or political concerns may explain as much about waiver decisions (and
transfers to adult criminal court) as the dangerousness or treatability of a youth")
89 See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 5 (summarizing findings that incarcera-
tion and detention, typically perceived as harsher and more punitive than other forms
of treatment, "do not reduce recidivism to a greater extent than restitution pro-
grams"). Schneider defines deterrence theory as the view that "criminal or delinquent
behavior can be reduced by increasing the certainty, severity, and celerity (speed) of
punishment." Id. at 2.
90 Zierdt, supra note 33, at 413 (citing Lisa A. Cintron, Rehabilitating the Juvenile
Court System: LimitingJuvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254,
1256 (1996)).
91 See id. at 413 (citing Eric L.Jensen, The Waiver ofJuveniles to Criminal Court: Policy
Goals, Empirical Realities, and Suggestions for Change, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 173, 197-98
(1994)).
92 For example, according to Marion County, Indiana Superior CourtJudgeJames
W. Payne,
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dence that suggests that punishment alone does not work, transfers
appear to have symbolic value, as they appease a voting public that fa-
vors punishment over rehabilitation. In an era when no policy maker
would wvish to be labeled as "soft" on crime, the increased use of trans-
fers-regardless of effects-represents to the public that juvenile
crime is taken seriously.
Not only does transfer to adult court appear to lack consistent de-
terrent effects, but incarceration seems equally ineffective. "The posi-
tion that incarceration deters youths from delinquency because they
fear punishment has little scientific support."13 A longitudinal study
by researcher Anne Schneider further confirms the fallacy of the be-
lief that punitive reforms such as confinement serve as a deterrent for
offending youth.94 Comparing punitive measures such as detention
and incarceration with more rehabilitation-focused programs such as
community restitution, Schneider found that "detention and incar-
ceration did not enhance perceptions [by juveniles] of certainty or se-
verity of punishment[,] and did not reduce recidivism to a greater ex-
tent than restitution programs.95
Although the United States stands alone as the only Western in-
dustrialized nation permitting the execution of individuals for mur-• • • 96
ders committed asjuveniles, the United States continues to have one
of the highest rates of adolescent homicide, serving as further proof
that even the most severe deterrence-based reforms have failed to re-
duce significantly juvenile criminal activity. While seventy-two nations
worldwide, including Russia and Libya, expressly prohibit the juvenile
when a 16- or 17-year old gets arrested committing a felony with a gun, he can
be tried as an adult. But typically, he posts bond and immediately gets out of
jail and back to the streets. When he is finally tried, he serves maybe five to 20
days injail. That same youngster, if he remained in thejuvenile system, would
be kept in detention until a hearing and then go to the Department of Cor-
rections for a minimum of one year.
David Rohn, Experts Say Juvenile Justice Needs Refora, INDIANAPoIs STAR, Oct. 15, 1999
<http://ivv.starnews.com/news/citystate/99/oct/1015stjuv.html>. Although the
possibility exists for a lighter sentence following transfer to adult court, a study compil-
ing statistics from the nation's 75 largest counties for the years 1990-1994 revealed that
68% of transferred juveniles convicted of felonies were sentenced to prison, with 32%
released on probation or with a fine. SeeNATiONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 175.
93 Asherman-Jusino, supra note 61, at 322 (citing RICHARD J. LUNDMAN,
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OFJUVENILE DELINQUENCY 204-38 (1993)).
94 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 5 (examining the links between incarceration
and recidivism).
95 Id.
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the imposition
of capital punishment on any person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age does not
violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
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death penalty, the United States remains in the company of countries
such as Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan in continuing the execution of crimi-
nals for crimes they committed as juveniles.97 "Indeed, the United
States reported the mostjuvenile executions" from 1981 to 1991, with• • 98
the execution of fourjuvenile offenders. Despite the use ofjuvenile
executions, serious juvenile crime persists. Based on data obtained by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for the year 1993, the
number of homicides per 100,000 children under the age of fifteen
was five times higher in the United States than in fifteen other indus-
trialized nations combined.0 Given the equally high rates of con-
finement of juveniles, these figures suggest that extremely harsh and
severe punishments are a poor deterrent ofjuvenile crime.
Despite the wealth of evidence to the contrary, an "abiding faith"
prevails in the belief that tougher punishments are the solution to ju-
venile crime."0
2. Sentencing Authority
Traditionally, juvenile court jurisdiction has extended to the age
of majority with confinement not to exceed that period. Nevertheless,
changes in sentencing authority laws in thirty-one states have resulted
in an expansion of sentencing options available to criminal and juve-
nile courts.101 "Through extended jurisdiction mechanisms, legisla-
tures enable the court to provide sanctions and services for a duration
of time that is in the best interests of the juvenile and the public, even
for older juveniles who have reached the age at which original juve-
nile court jurisdiction ends."10 2 In some states that have recently
changed the jurisdictional aspects of the juvenile court, "blended sen-
tencing" has been used to maintain control over juveniles who have
97 See Cathleen E. Hull, "Enlightened by a HumanzJustice":" An International Law Ar-
gument Against theJuvenile Death Penalty, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 1079, 1094-95 (1999) (not-
ing that 72 countries expressly prohibitjuvenile executions, while only six continue to
executejuveniles).
98 Id. at 1095.
See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 25 (noting that the number of homicides
per 100,000 children under 15 was 2.57 in the United States versus 0.51 in the other
countries).
100 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 1 ("Americans have an abiding faith in pun-
ishement.... Policy changes reflecting shifts toward more punishment-oriented poli-
cies forjuveniles have been widely documented. ...").
101 See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 89 (noting that changes in laws designed
to crack down on juvenile crime have led to increased sentencing options in these
states).
02 Id. at 93.
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aged out of the system.'03 In this manner, juvenile courts may impose
adult sentences on adjudicated delinquents that result in confinement
beyond the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction.X This re-
form measure appears to be more in sync with the rehabilitative phi-
losophy of the original juvenile court than other state legislative ef-
forts. As Professor David Yellen notes, blended sentencing "reveals an
unwillingness to abandon all serious juvenile offenders to the harsh
world of the adult criminal court. If the offender satisfies the terms of
the juvenile sentence, the adult sentence is vacated.""" The use of
blended sentencing as a safeguard for youth who do not benefit from
rehabilitation was most recently questioned in the case of thirteen-
year-old Nathaniel Abraham, a Michigan resident who at age eleven
became the youngest person to be tried and convicted as an adult.
6
Rather than rely on Michigan's blended sentencing provisions, the
sentencing judge issued a "sweeping condemnation of Michigan's get-
tough juvenile offender laws" and ordered Nathaniel to a sentence of
juvenile detention until age twenty-one with no threat of a pending
107adult sentence. According to the sentencing judge, blended sen-
tencing "'take(s) everyone off the hook"' by holding out "'incarcera-
tion as a long-term solution'" and diverting resources from meaning-
ful rehabilitative efforts.0 8 Professor Yellen notes, however, that
blended sentencing provides juvenile offenders with a "last chance"
for rehabilitation through treatment services in a juvenile setting and
"hold [s] out hope for the possibility of redemption.""9
3. Confidentiality
When a general rehabilitative philosophy dominated juvenile jus-
tice policies, juveniles were permitted (and in a few jurisdictions con-
tinue to be permitted) to proceed into adulthood with a clean slate.
Recent state legislation in forty-seven states resulted in changes in the
103 Id.
104 See id. (defining "blended sentencing"). Such a response is particularly useful
in the case of a borderline juvenile, one who is quite close to aging out of the system
and whose amenability to treatment is conditioned upon continued confinement.
105 Yellen, supra note 14, at 997 (footnotes omitted).
10" See Louise Knott & Oralandar Brand-Williams, Young Killer Gets Juvenile Detention:
State's Get-Tough Policy Blasted by SentencingJudg, DETROIT NEws,Jan. 14,2000, at Al.
107 Id. (noting Judge Eugene Moore's denunciation of Michigan's "get tough"
measure allowing children under 14 to be tried as adults and his decision to sentence
Nathaniel Abraham as ajuvenile).
108 Id.
109 Yellen, supra note 14, at 998.
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confidentiality provisions, including expungement, making records
and proceedings more open."' These legislative reforms fail to rec-
ognize the important policy motivations behind expungement. Ex-
pungement grants the juvenile confidentiality with regard to offenses
committed while under juvenile court jurisdiction. The varying state
statutes governing expungement are written with the goal of avoiding
stigmatization of juveniles and preventing negative labeling of an in-
dividual who may have since reformed.' Without expungement, the
permanent stigma of juvenile delinquency may significantly hinder a
young person's functioning in society. Public access to records of
youthful offenses may tend to negatively influence decisions regarding
admission to higher education or applications for employment.
Adults with offenses perhaps from as long as twenty years ago may be
severely prejudiced with hampered opportunities for economic and
social advancement. "Expungement statutes... are at minimum at-
tempts to lessen the additional penalty that public opinion places
upon former offenders and to overcome the reality that, as Lord Coke
stated, 'peona mori potest, culpa perennis erit'-though punishment can
terminate, guilt endures forever."
' 2
Despite the move toward harsher juvenile justice policies and
practices, as demonstrated by increased use of waivers, changes in sen-
110 "As of the end of the 1997 legislative session,juvenile codes in 47 States and the
District of Columbia allowed information contained in juvenile court records to be
specifically released to at least one of the following parties: [t]he prosecutor; [law
enforcement; [s]ocial agencies; [s]chool(s); [t]he victim(s); [t]he public." NATIONAL
REPORT, supra note 6, at 101. In addition, during the 1996 and 1997 legislative ses-
sions, 11 states enacted new laws either allowing or requiring school notification re-
gardingjuveniles charged with committing a serious crime. See id. In a similar effort
to discard traditional confidentiality provisions, by the end of 1997, 46 states and the
District of Columbia had enacted legislation allowing fingerprinting ofjuveniles; simi-
larly, 45 states and the District of Columbia now allow photographing ofjuvenile of-
fenders in order to maintain a record of criminal history. See id. The most radical de-
parture from traditional confidentiality provisions is the passage of legislation
permitting names of juveniles, and sometimes pictures and court records, to be re-
leased to the media. Such provisions contradict the benefits of expungement ofjuve-
nile records, making knowledge of ajuvenile's offense all but permanent.
I Rates of recidivism demonstrate that 54% of first-time male and 73% of first-
time female juvenile offenders do not reenter the juvenile system. See id. at 80 (dis-
cussing gender differences in recidivism patterns). Although expungement policies
are criticized as providing a veil of secrecy for violent offenders, the policies would ap-
pear to benefit the majority of children within the system. Those with only one juve-
nile offense who have been appropriately "scared straight" are not burdened with last-
ing repercussions from a one time brush with the law.112
T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of Expunging
Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 885, 891 (1996).
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tencing authority, and erosion of confidentiality provisions, several
states have incorporated restorative justice language of the Balanced
Approach and Restorative Justice Model ("BARJ") into their juvenile
delinquency provisions."3 Pennsylvania, for example, in enacting the
Juvenile Act,'1 4 simultaneously elevated the importance of criminal
sanctions in response to juvenile offenses while also promoting inter-
ventions to the treatment and rehabilitation of children. Although
such state measures reflect a retainment of core tenets of the original
juvenile justice system, the beneficial aspects of these measures are
mitigated by an additional emphasis on punishment."5 The inclusion
of punishment language reflects an ascendance of what Professor Feld
terms the "Principle of Offense" and represents a growing departure
from the original rehabilitation-orientedjuvenile court" 6 While some
states codify a balanced model in theirjuvenile statutes, they often fail
to realize a balanced system. Instead, they de-emphasize the role of
competency development within the purpose clause of juvenile codes
and replace it with language suggesting a retributive approach. As of
1997, nine states stressed punishment as a philosophical goal in their
juvenile code purpose clauses while thirty-two listed both treatment
and punishment, similar to Pennsylvania's statute."7  The trend of
employing a retributive philosophy, as compared to a rehabilitation-
treatment based model, is further illustrated in the specific terminol-
ogy employed in recentjuvenile legislation." 8
US See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 87 (listing the states that have incorpo-
rated restorative justice language in their juvenile codes); infra text accompanying
notes 219-22 (describing the restorative justice model that emphasizes offender ac-
countability, public safety, and competency development).
14 See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301 (West 1982) (citing the purposes of the Ju-
venile Act).
1 Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act, for example, articulates the following as one of its
legislative purposes:
Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide for children
committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and rehabilitation
which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the
imposition of accountability for offenses committed and the development of
competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive
members of the community.
§ 6301 (b) (2).
16 Feld, supra note 55, at 821-22.
17 See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 87 (noting states that include punish-
ment, treatment, or both, in the purpose clause of theirjuvenile codes).
1SeeFeld, supra note 55, at 821-22 ("Changes in juvenile courts' 'purpose clauses'
to emphasize charateristics of the offense rather than the offender reflect the ascen-
dance of the Principle of Offense.... Recent legislative changes in juvenile sentencing
statutes and correctional administrative guidelines emphasize proportional and de-
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B. Federal Legislation
Federal legislation has been guided by the same primarily punitive
philosophy that has shaped legislation at the state level." 9 In 1997, the
House proposed, and referred to the Senate, House Bill 1818, the Ju-
venile Crime Control and Delinquency Prevention Act,1' ° the aim of
which was to amend the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act of 1974,21 bringing it more in line with the punishment orienta-
tion prevalent in recent crime legislation. This bill marked a shift in
philosophical approach, as evidenced by the proposal to rename the
Office ofJuvenileJustice and Delinquency Prevention as the Office of
Juvenile Crime Control and Delinquency Prevention. ' It also pro-
vided states with financial incentives to redevelop and redefine their
own juvenile systems.123 The bill conditioned eligibility for incentive
grants upon states' enacting certain punitive juvenile justice reforms,
including a requirement that all violent juvenile delinquents be fin-
gerprinted and photographed and that records be made available to
schools.
24
Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee considered Senate
Bill 10, the Violent and RepeatJuvenile Offender Act of 1997.125 The
bill, however, was never put to a vote. It proposed to eliminate a long-
standing requirement that federal courts only hear juvenile prosecu-
tions in cases of concurrent jurisdiction or when the state declined to
prosecute the juvenile. 26 Critics were especially skeptical about this
terminate sentences based on both the present offense and prior record."). An addi-
tional example of such legislative changes, Jochner explains, appears in terminology
employed in the IllinoisJuvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998. SeeJochner, supra
note 23, at 152. She notes that, "[fMor example, 'adjudicatory hearings' are now la-
beled 'trials,' and 'dispositional hearings' are now called 'sentencing hearings.' Simi-
larly, juveniles are no longer 'taken into custody;' instead, they are 'arrested.'" Id.
(footnotes omitted).
119 See 142 CONG. REC. S10,192, S10,194-95 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Domenici) (calling the Senate to "change the focus of Federal juvenile crime and
delinquency prevention efforts" because "our juvenile courts have focused too heavily
on rehabilitation and not enough on punishment").
120 H.R. 1818, 105th Cong. (1997).
121 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5785 (1994 & Supp. I11 1997).
122 SeeH.R 1818, § 104.
122 See id. § 110 (authorizing incentive grants to states "to carry out projects de-
signed to preventjuvenile delinquency").
24 See id. (requiring specific punitive juvenile justice reform by a state in order for
it to be eligible for incentive grants).
125 S. 10, 105th Cong. (1997).
126 See id. § 102 (1997) (granting United States attorneys the discretion to tryjuve-
niles in the United States District Courts "if the juvenile is charged with a federal of-
RHETORTC, REALTY, AND JUVENLEJUSTICE
measure for fear that it would serve to federalize juvenile crime.12 In
the spirit of the get-tough movement, Senate Bill 10 included a provi-
sion to lower the age minimum for trial of capital cases from eighteen
to sixteen years.128
Rhetoric and public opinion have once again emerged as power-
ful players in the most recent debate over juvenile crime reform. Not
surprisingly, the two bills that remain in conference at the time of this
writing-the Consequences for Juvenile Offenders Act of 19991' and
the Violent and Repeat Juvenile Offender Accountability and Reha-
bilitation Act of 1999s--both favor punitive measures for juvenile de-
linquents, particularly violent and repeat offenders.1 ' Responding to
these bills, the Children's Defense Fund ("CDF"), a leading child ad-
vocacy organization, stated that House Bill 1501 could harm young of-
fenders by expanding prosecutorial waivers and broadening the scope
of federal statutory exclusions, which runs counter to research sug-
gesting that trying children as adults actually increases crime.32
Moreover, CDF notes the danger of provisions that: (1) allow chil-
dren to come into contact with adults while detained in adult facili-
ties, thus placing them at an increased risk of harm,"3 (2) impose
mandatory minimum sentences for certain offenses, 3 4 and (3) remove
fense").
127 See 144 CONG. REc. S12,644, S12,644-45 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1998) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (expressing concern regarding the federalization of juvenile crime and
the fear that S. 10 would "impos[e] on the States a one-size-fits-all uniform sewn-up in
Washington for dealing withjuvenile crime").
12 See S. 10, § 103.
129 H.R. 1501, 106th Cong. (1999).
IS S. 254, 106th Cong. (1999).
131 The Senate bill points to the "inadequa[cy] and inappropriate[ness]" of the
rehabilitative model for some juveniles, id. § 2(a) (6), and notes that public safety and
accountability are "paramount concerns," id. § 2(b) (1). This retributive philosophy
appears to be based on the belief, as expressed by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), that
"[w] hen ajuvenile commits an act as heinous as the worst adult crime, he or she is not
a kid anymore" and should not be treated like one. 145 CONG. REc. S4981, S4984
(daily ed. May 11, 1999).
See Children's Defense Fund, H.. 1501, The Consequences for Juvenile Offenders
Act: A Danger to Children (visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.childrensdefense.org/
juvenilejustice/hr1501.html> (faulting the bill for "ignoring studies" demonstrating
the adverse effects of trying children as adults).
133 See id. (noting that "children are eight times more likely to commit suicide, five
times more likely to be sexually assaulted, and twice as likely to be assaulted by staff in
adult jails than in juvenile facilities").
See id. (noting that "draconian mandatory minimums would likely impose
harsher penalties on youthful offenders than adult criminals guilty of the same of-
fenses").
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confidentiality protections of juvenile records."5 CDF also criticizes
Senate Bill 254 for provisions that would expand prosecutorial waiv-
ers, weaken protections against detention of in adultjails, and remove
the requirement that states "address the disproportionate confine-
ment of minority juveniles in secure facilities.""5 There was, however,
a clear effort to strike a balance (at least on paper) between the need
for "public safety' 3 ' and rehabilitation and "correction" s' of juvenile
offenders.
III. DON'T BELIEVE THE HYPE: STATISTCs AND STEREOTPES
This section presents a model for understanding the cyclical na-
ture of legislative and public responses to juvenile crime and investi-
gates the sources of information (or misinformation) that have re-
cently driven the cycle. It also explores several correlates of juvenile
crime and stereotypes about delinquency that have a disproportion-
ately damaging impact on poor and minority juveniles.
A. Everything Old Is New Again
According to noted researcher ThomasJ. Bernard, juvenile justice
and reform policies are inherently cyclical in nature: policies are
shaped directly by changing social responses to juvenile crime and
rhetoric about juvenile delinquents, rather than actual increased
criminality.'3 9 "The cycle begins," he asserts, "when justice officials
and the general public are convinced that juvenile crime is at an ex-
ceptionally high level, and there are many harsh punishments but few
lenient treatments forjuvenile offenders."4  Justice officials next con-
clude that the limited availability of lenient programs contributes to
the problem; accordingly, they increase lenient options for juveniles
as a means of decreasing the level of offending. 4' Bernard posits,
1 See id. (arguing that such measures "would have devastating consequences for
the future employment and education of many children").
13 Children's Defense Fund, Background on S. 254, the Violent and Repeat OffenderAct
(visited Nov. 11, 1999) <http://www.childrensdefense.org/juvenilejustice/s254.htm>.
5s7 S. 254, 106th Cong. § 2(b) (1) (1999).
iss S. 254, § 2(a) (12).
139 See BERNARD, supra note 8, at 3-4 (introducing the concept of a "cyclical pattern
in juvenile justice policies").
140 Id. at 3.
141 See id. (suggesting that officials at this stage of the cycle are reluctant to impose
harsh punishments because they believe such treatments "will make the minor of-
fender worse").
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however, that because juvenile crime is a "continuing presence in
modem society,,1 2 justice officials will have little success in signifi-
candy reducing crime or allaying the public's fears14 When juvenile
crime either remains static or fails to abate, justice officials blame the
leniency of treatment and respond with increasingly punitive "get
tough" measures; the number of punitive programs subsequently in-
creases while, concurrently, lenient and treatment-oriented programs
decline.4 Following a period of extreme harshness and largely puni-
tive policies, when the level of juvenile crime remains exceptionally
high, "justice officials... are forced to choose [once again] between
harshly punishing juvenile offenders and doing nothing at all. The
cycle has returned to where it started."'4
Most notably, Bernard concludes that "[a] t every stage of the cy-
cle, justice officials and the general public believe three ideas: that
juvenile crime is at an exceptionally high level, that present juvenile
justice policies make the problem worse, and that changing those
policies will reduce juvenile crime.",46 Although Bernard's thesis was
published before the 1993 peak in juvenile crime, his predictions have
proven accurate. Based on the driving principles of his cyclical
model, he quite accurately predicted in 1992 that
[j]uveniles will continue to be a high crime rate group, and they also will
continue to receive less punishment than adults who commit the same
offenses. Adults will continue to be convinced that there is a "juvenile
crime wave" that started in the last thirty or forty years, and they will con-
tinue to believe that lenient punishments are the cause of that crime
147
wave.
In every decade since the 1960s, each time that public confidence
in a treatment and rehabilitation model has diminished, it was re-
placed by a strong desire to punish juvenile offenders with measures
corresponding to the seriousness of their offenses. Applying Ber-
nard's thesis, a "get tough on crime" approach would have been pre-
dictably favored in the mid-to-late 1990s because the public both sub-
scribed to the rhetoric about "superpredators" and perceived the
142 I at8.
143 See id. (noting thatjuvenile justice policies are often based on an "illusion that
delinquency is a problem that can be solved").
See d. at 4 (noting that treatment-oriented measures are phased out until "there
are many harsh punishments available for responding to juvenile offender but few le-
nient treatments").
Hs id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 155.
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failing juvenile justice system as too lenient. 8 Applying the same
logic, a "get tough" approach, however, would not have been war-
ranted if the public more widely accepted documented declines in ju-
venile crime as true. Bernard's thesis is therefore borne out and the
cycle of reform perpetuated even when public perception about ele-
vated levels ofjuvenile crime is largely inaccurate. 49
B. The Appeal of Pulp Fiction
"Contrary to popular belief '[violent] juvenile crime is not ris-
ing out of control.""" Nevertheless, "[a]lthough violent crime rates,
including rates of violent juvenile crime, are down in most major cit-
ies, .. . the public still fears teen violence." 5 ' The public's widespread
and angry sentiment toward young offenders has fueled the most re-
cent calls for reforming the juvenile justice system. This punitive atti-
tude is related to the perceived inability of the system to effectively
and permanently to reduce juvenile crime rates, something that Ber-
nard notes is nearly impossible. With regard to the longstanding na-
ture of the public's misperception, he states that
[s]imilar alarms were raised in the [1960s, 1950s], 1940s, 1930s, and
1920s. At those times, people believed (as they do today) that the coun-
try was being overwhelmed in a rising tide ofjuvenile delinquency and
crime, and that it had not been a serious problem only forty or fifty years
ago. Juvenile crime itself seems to go up and down, but the quotations
about how terrible juveniles are seem to stay the same.
15
2
The public's misguided perceptions of a national increase in ju-
venile crime are largely a product of the media. In part, the media's
disproportionate coverage of high-profile incidents of violent teen
behavior excites the public's worst fears.'53 As Professor Zierdt notes,
148 See BERNARD, supra note 8, at 162 (noting that the contemporary "get tough"
advocates viewjuvenile delinquents as hardened criminals who "use leniency as an op-
portunity to commit more frequent and serious offenses without fear of the conse-
quences").
149 See Zierdt, supra note 33, at 412 n.85 (noting that although "the predictions of
an onslaught of violentjuvenile crime have been proven wrong 2 years in a row," the
call to get tough persists).
150 Burke, supra note 9, at 1027 (text altered in the original).
151 Stephen J. Morse, Immatuity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
15-16 (1998).
152 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 33 (citation omitted).
153 See NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 51 ("Public perceptions ofjuvenile of-
fending have been influenced by attention focused on high-profile incidents."); see also
Lisa Belkin, Parents Blaming Parents, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 31, 1999, (Magazine), at 60
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"[a] Imost every article written today concerning juvenile justice seems
to publicize the most heinous crimes committed by juveniles. The re-
sulting hysteria has caused the public to demand swift action to curb
escalating juvenile crime .... "'-" Indeed, contemporary reform meas-
ures at the state and federal levels that call for more severe responses
to the growing threat ofjuvenile crime feed off this hysteria. Despite
confusion about the true nature of juvenile crime trends, or perhaps
because of it, a blanket statement that the rate of violentjuvenile delin-
quency is continuing to increase does not appear to be supported by
overwhelming data.
In fact, juvenile crime is on the decline. The authors of the Na-
tional Report, upon analyzing the Bureau of Justice Statistics's Na-
tional Crime Victimization Survey ("NCVS"), concluded that although
the rate of serious juvenile violence peaked in 1994 at 1,230,000, the
highest recorded level since the NCVS began collecting data in 1973,
serious violence by juveniles dropped by thirty-three percent between
1993 and 1997. Moreover, the proportion of violent offenses com-
mitted by juveniles has not increased, but instead remained relatively
156unchanged over the last twenty-five years. In addition, although in-
cidents of violentjuvenile crime continue to capture headlines, garner
support for crackdowns on crime, and play a large role in influencing
juvenile justice reform, the majority of juvenile court cases involve
nonviolent property, not person, offenses. 57 Indeed, the Coordinat-
ing Council on Juvenile justice and Delinquency Prevention reported
in 1996 that "only a fraction of youth (one-half of I percent), is ar-
rested for violent crimes each year," a figure that places the problem
of violentjuvenile crime appropriately in context.55
(commenting on the recent "roll call of high school tragedy" making headlines within
the past three years). Belkin lists the stories of eachjuvenile: 16-year-old Luke Wood-
ham who, in October 1997 in Pearl, Mississippi, stabbed his mother and then shot nine
fellow students, killing two; 14-year-old Michael Carneal, who, one month later, shot
and killed three classmates in West Paducah, Kentucky, 11-year-old Andrew Golden
and 13-year-old MitchellJohnson who "staged a false fire alarm and then opened fire
on the exiting crowd," killing five in Jonesboro, Arkansas in October 1998. Id. "And
then there was Columbine, the massacre that, because it played out on television,
seems to have crystallized all the others." Id.
15 Zierdt, supra note 33, at 402.
S1 eeNATIONALREPORT, supra note 6 at 62 (noting the 33% drop in violent crime
rates).
156 See id. (analyzing violentjuvenile crime rates from 1973 to 1997).
157 See Stevenson et al., supra note 75, at 7 ("Although violentjuvenile crimes grab
headlines, the bulk of the court's delinquency work is in the handling of a large vol-
ume of crimes against property such as larceny, vandalism, and motor vehicle theft.").
15 COORDINATING COUNCIL ONJUVENILEJUSTICE AND DEINQUENCYPREVENTON,
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Because a "get tough on crime" stance serves a "get elected" strat-
egy, contemporary decision makers like legislators, prosecutors, and
judges, must make knee-jerk political responses based on the public's
unsubstantiated fears. 9 Voters, spurred by underlying feelings of so-
cial unrest and strong retributive reactions to sensational incidents of
juvenile violence, call for increased confinement and incarceration.
As Professor Feld notes, "[p]oliticians have exploited [the pub-
lic's] ... fears, decried a coming generation of 'superpredators' suf-
fering from 'moral poverty,' and demonized young people in order to
muster support for [punitive] policies... Although the hype about
violent juvenile crime makes good news and great headlines, it does
not necessarily translate into good policy nor serve as a meaningful
barometer of crime. As Judge Koontz notes, some critics suggest that
"reforms represent no more than a swing in the pendulum of public
opinion undoubtedly fostered by the mass media's exposure of the
whole topic ofjuvenile delinquency and sensational reporting of par-
ticularly violent crimes involvingjuvenles."1
6
1
It is possible that the increased attention to juvenile crime and the
frequent calls for harsh reforms are related to a shift in both the visi-
bility of juvenile crime and the characteristics of young perpetrators.
Quite reasonably, the occurrence of crime in areas previously shel-
tered from such incidents has prompted increased pressure for judi-
cial and legislative intervention and fueled the perception that juve-
nile crime is rampant and on the rise. No longer confined by the
boundaries of urban poverty and the inner city, incidents of violence
are occurring in suburban and rural areas at slightly increased rates, 62
bringing the problem closer to home for many citizens.
C. UnderstandingJuvenile Delinquency: Causes and Correlates
According to Thomas Bernard, since "U]uveniles have always been
COMBATING VIOLENCE AND DELINQUENCY. THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE ACTION
PLAN 1 (1996).
159 See SIMON I. SINGER, RECRIMINALIZING DELINQUENCY 7 (1996) (suggesting that
New York's early recriminalization movement in the late 1970s was spurred in part by a
political agenda and a need to avoid appearing "soft" on crime); see also MILLER, supra
note 19, at 142 (quoting theorist David Frum's observation that "[ylou no longer get
far in public life by preaching.., that criminals can be rehabilitated"); FELD, supra
note 16, at 208 (noting that reform efforts are often guided by "[p]olitical slogans,
rather than empirical research evidence or evaluation research").
160 FELD, supra note 16, at 208.
1 Koontz, supra note 8, at 180-81.
162 See HEIDE, supra note 17, at 7 ("Although most young killers live in cities, in-
creasing numbers reside in rural and suburban areas.").
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a high-crime-rate group, going back to when Cain killed Abel....
[W]e can expect that juveniles are always going to be a high-crime-
rate group.' ' 6s What we can derive from Bernard's theory is that the
cyclical and long-standing nature ofjuvenile delinquency suggests that
there is perhaps no new and unique source of harm, no juvenile crime
virus of the 1990s.16 A solution to the problem, if any truly exists, re-
lies on a thorough understanding of the overt and latent harms that
continue to inflict widespread damage on communities and give rise
to juvenile crimess
Johnson's 1964 war on poverty, which took place in the context of
efforts to combat juvenile crime, ushered in the federal government's
first national response to juvenile delinquency. It is not surprising
that the issues of poverty and juvenile crime were linked in this man-
ner, as they had been since the child-saving efforts of the progressive
reformers and, later, the inception of the juvenile court166 As Profes-
sor Adler notes, the problems encountered in the war on poverty of
the 1960s have worsened due to changes in the economy and disinte-
gration in the social fabric of inner cities and areas of concentrated
poverty.167 Mediating institutions, such as family, churches, schools,
and community centers, that at one time provided the structural,
emotional, and spiritual infrastructure of life have "decayed concur-
rently with the real estate, leaving a spiritual landscape as ominous as
the physical one."16s Noted sociologist William Julius Wilson echoes
this sentiment, concluding that "[n]eighborhoods plagued by high
levels ofjoblessness are more likely to experience low levels of social
organization: the two go hand in hand." 69 In economically depressed
and isolated urban communities, despair and sociopathological activi-
ties such as gangs, drugs, and violence permeate young peoples' daily
lives, all against the backdrop of "family breakups and problems in the
16 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 165.
NA See id. at 186 (noting that "the problem ofjuvenile delinquency... in one way
or another... is a permanent and unchanging product of human nature").
16 See id. ("Solving [the juvenile delinquency] problem.., requires changing the
larger social conditions that gave rise to the problem in the first place.").
w See supra notes 20-28, 200-08 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
link between poverty and juvenile delinquency).
167 See George Adler, Community Action and Maximum Feasible Participation: An Op-
portunity Lost but Not Forgotten for Expanding Democracy at Home, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETincs & PUB. POLY 547, 567 (1994) (suggesting that the war on poverty may offer
valuable lessons applicable to an analysis of cities today).
168 Id.
M WnflJAMJULUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW
URBAN POOR21 (1996).
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organization of family life."' 70 The cumulative effect of these pro-
nounced risk factors poses a monumental challenge for policymakers
intent on reducing the incidence of juvenile crime. Understanding
the complex nature of the problem is necessary to create an effective
solution.
Theories about the multiple causes of delinquency abound, yet
none has conclusively narrowed a precise causal pathway, as perhaps
no single explanation suffices. 17' Longitudinal empirical research into
the relationship between family variables and delinquency reveals that
several negative family variables are associated with delinquency.'
Poor discipline, poor guidance, poor supervision, poor problem-
solving, and intrafamilial stress and conflict were all associated with
official reports and self-reports of delinquency and rates of delinquent
recidivism."7 Social scientists James Snyder and Gerald Patterson
propose an analysis of delinquent behavior that focuses on "defective
socialization, arising first at home and subsequently via antisocial
peers."1 74 That these harmful effects are not "countered by satisfactory
adult models" in the home, at school, or in the community poses an
even more troubling problem.' 75 In assessing the quality of delinquent
children's earliest experiences, researchers note that "[h]omes that
produce delinquents are characterized by poor discipline. Parents fail
to label behavior as unacceptable, fail to track unacceptable behavior
in different settings, and fail to manage it in a consistent manner....
Of all parental variables, poor supervision has the strongest associa-
tion with delinquency."' 76 Essentially these risk factors collectively il-
lustrate a downward spiral towards delinquency. Troubled familial
environments breed troubled children who, in association with devi-
170 Id.
171 Difficulty in pinning down a cause is furthered by the inability to define more
precisely what exactly is meant by the non-legal term "juvenile delinquent." Depend-
ing on how it is conceptualized, delinquent behavior may range from normal adoles-
cent "acting out" behavior to egregious, abnormal, or even psychopathological behav-
ior. For one view that describes the term "juvenile delinquent" as a euphemism for
'young criminal" and notes that use of the term shifts the focus away from punishment
and toward the potential for rehabilitation, see BERNARD, supra note 8, at 49.
172 Correlations like those discussed in the cited studies may demonstrate the
strength of a concurrence of variables, but only allow one to make inferences about
possible causes of delinquency. The complex nature ofjuvenile delinquency, composed
of infinite confounding variables, precludes making statements about direct causes.
173 See NURCOMBE & PARTETr, supra note 72, at 294-95 (describing psychological
research on the relationship between family interaction and social learning).
174 Id. at 295.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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ant peer groups, act out impulsively and destructively.
Familial and environmental factors clearly play a significant role
in creating a context for juvenile crime, but they do not do all the
work in explaining why many other young people engage in delin-
quent and, in particular, violent crimes. Examining the broader con-
text of juvenile crime, psychologist Kathleen Heide has identified flf-
teen variables believed to be related to serious juvenile violence, a7
grouping them into the following five main categories: (1) situational
factors, (2) societal influences, (3) resource availability, (4) personal-
ity characteristics, and (5) their cumulative or interactive effects 78
Situational factors include child abuse and neglect and an absence of
positive parental, particularly male, role models.'7 Societal influ-
ences, she explains, include a crisis in leadership, a lack of heroes, and
exposure to and victimization by acts of violence within the commu-
nity and especially in the home.80 Resource availability is defined as
access to guns, involvement with illegal substances, subjection to pov-
erty, and a lack of developmental resources. 81 According to Heide,
the sociocultural risk factors for delinquency occur against a backdrop
of risk-creating personality characteristics that include low self-esteem,
inability to deal with strong negative feelings, lack of opportunity for
constructive involvement, poor problem-solving ability, poor interper-
sonal skills, poor communication skills, and prejudice and hatred.
8 2
For the most part, such shortcomings may highlight the failure of
adults to instill in all children and adolescents a sense of belonging
and purpose. Noting the impact of this failure, Bernard states that
"O]uveniles who engage in delinquency.., lack just such a sense of
having a role and place in the larger society."'
In light of the embeddedness of youth in society-at-large, delin-
quent behavior has also been attributed to juveniles' underdeveloped
sense of identity,' which leaves them more vulnerable to the influ-
17 See HEIDE, supra note 17, at 36-37 (identifying and listing the 15 variables).
While Heide presents these variables in the context of understanding serious juvenile
violence, particularly juvenile homicide, I argue that they apply equally well to an un-
derstanding of less serious offenses against persons as well as other destructive behav-
iors such as property crimes.
178 See id. (identifying the five categories).
179 See id. at 37-41.
I8O See i at 41-44.
181 See id. at 44-46.
182 See iU. at 46-48 (commenting on the importance of personality characteristics).
183 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 187.
184 See id. at 187 (noting thatjuvenile delinquency is lower in societies wherejuve-
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ence of peer pressure and of increasingly widespread negative and vio-
lent images in the media. Psychoanalytic theory postulates that dimin-
ished attachment to parents with whom children may already have a
conflicted or strained parent-child relationship creates the impetus
for juvenile delinquency, particularly during adolescence when the
child is attempting to establish an independent self.18 In the transi-
tion required by this task of adolescent development, "acting out" be-
havior is more likely to manifest in the context of weakened internal-
ized social and parental control.
186
With respect to the cumulative effect of risk factors and conditions
that encourage the development of juvenile delinquency, Heide re-
marks that children growing up in the presence of a number of the
above-mentioned variables have "little or nothing left to lose"187 and
describes them as those:
who are angry, frequently in pain, and too often unattached to other
human beings due to experiences in their home and neighborhood en-
vironments .... Many of these youths lack... the resources to improve
their lives .... As a result, many juveniles today are living under extreme
stress and are severely alienated.... Often chronically bored,
they... commit crimes for fun. They live in the moment. To them,
thrills--and lives-are cheap.
18
8
Defining causes and correlates ofjuvenile delinquency has signifi-
cant legal consequences. Were juvenile crime to be understood as a
phenomenon caused entirely by negative environmental influences
working upon the innocent individual, the public might favor a con-
tinued parentalistic rehabilitative approach of the original juvenile
court. If, as Professor Beschle notes, juvenile delinquents are under-
stood as autonomous beings capable of making rational choices as
well as adults, thus granting less weight to the influence of environ-
mental forces as direct causes of delinquency, then a retributive re-
sponse would be warranted.'89 Adolescents with the capacity to form
niles are "firmly embedded in a larger social context... with a clear understanding of
the roles they would play and the functions they would have in the larger society").
185 See NURCOMBE & PARTLETT, supra note 72, at 297 (citing the work of attach-
ment theoristJohn Bowlby).
186 Martin Gold & Richard J. Petronio, Delinquent Behavior in Adolescence, in
HANDBOOK OF ADOLEScENT PSYCHOLOGY 495, 501 (Joseph Adelson ed., 1980) (survey-
ing psychoanalytic theories of adolescent "acting out").
7HEIDE, supra note 17, at 49 (describing the cumulative effect of risk factors for
juvenile delinquency).
18 Id. (citations omitted).
189 See Donald L. Beschle, The Juvenile Justice Counterrevolution: Responding to Cogni-
tive Dissonance in the Law's View of the Decision-Making Capacity of Minors, 48 EMORY L.J.
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the requisite mens rea could reasonably be found guilty of adult
crimes. Professor Feld, in his examination of this issue, notes that, al-
though as physically capable as adults of inflicting harm, and perhaps
"abstractly aware of 'right from wrong,' juveniles] are less capable
than adults of making sound judgments or moral distinctions."' 90 Al-
though he favors abolishing the juvenile court as a separate institu-
tion, Feld argues that juveniles are less responsible and hence less
blameworthy than adults and that their diminished responsibilityjusti-
fles a lesser punishment. Most importantly, he highlights the role of
societal forces in guiding the development of delinquency, noting that
"the crimes of children are seldom their fault alone; society shares at
least some of the blame for their offenses as a result of their truncated
opportunities to learn to make correct choices."19'
Not only are youth limited in their ability to be responsible due to
a lack of experience making responsible choices, but they are far
more susceptible to peer group influences and group dynamic proc-
esses than their adult counterparts. Professor Morse argues that since
children and adolescents are more vulnerable to peer pressure and
may "lack normative competence because they are generally unable to
grasp the good reasons not to breach an expectation," they should be• 192
accorded a "youth discount" in sentencing. Professor Feld similarly
reasons that since "[j]uveniles are less responsible, hence less blame-
worthy, than adults.., they 'deserve' a lesser punishment than an
adult who commits the same crime." In practice, a youth discount
would result in a "legislatively-mandated reduction in punishment for
all partially responsible adolescents. 94 Under a youth discount pol-
icy, juveniles could be tried in adult courts and receive more lenient
sentences mitigated by age or other offender-oriented variables.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma,9 5 the Supreme Court supported re-
duced culpability for juveniles, holding that execution for crimes
committed when the defendant was under sixteen years of age at the
time of his or her offense violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
65, 101-05 (1999) (discussing the policy implications of assuming that adolescents can
make mature life decisions).
190 Feld, supra note 55, at 899.
191 1& at g00.
192 Morse, supra note 151, at 23. Professor Morse concedes that "in comparison to
the case of adults, poor judgment more substantially affects the criminal conduct of
adolescents as a class," but posits that this factor may not be a sufficient reason for
holding mid- to late-adolescents less accountable for their actions. Id. at 56.
194 Feld, supra note 55, at 900.
19 Morse, supra note 151, at 66.
195 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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tion on cruel and unusual punishment. s The Court concluded that
"a young person is not capable of acting with the degree of culpability
that can justify the ultimate penalty."197 Fundamentally, "youth is
more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when
a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological
damage."'98 Even within a "get tough" retributive approach, therefore,
what appears important in decision making is the degree to which we
discount the culpability of youth due to the influence of familial and
environmental forces and related psychological harm. Environmental
and individual factors are used to both discount culpability and miti-
gate punishment of juvenile offenders while advocating for treatment
or rehabilitation. It is quite possible, however, that the same envi-
ronmental and individual factors used to protect children from pun-
ishment may also be used to further punitive aims and target certain
"suspect" groups. In this manner, the mitigating factors that exist in
reality can, through hype, become the hysterical rhetoric that drives
the cycle of punitive juvenile justice reform.
This phenomenon is particularly likely when the environmental
and individual factors are poverty and race. Poverty and youth crime
have shared a long association, as "the original idea ofjuvenile delin-
quency was derived from and merged with the earlier idea of pauper-
ism."' 9 As Bernard notes, the development of the juvenile court was a
result of benevolent reforms as well as efforts to control the threat to
social order posed by paupers."' Paupers were pejoratively defined as
"undeserving" poor people whose circumstances were due to their
own vice, corruption, and moral depravity. 0 1 "'[J]uvenile delinquents'
originally were lower-class juveniles who stole property from middle-
and upper-class adults in urban settings."2 2 Indeed, houses of refuge
were developed to rescue such children from their inferior settings
and from potential pauperism by altering "their weak moral na-
tures."203 Revisionist historians characterize the development of the
juvenile courts as "expansive agencies of coercive social control that
196 See id. at 833-38 (explaining why this punishment offends the prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment).
197 Id. at 823.
198 Id. at 834 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
19 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 66-67.
200 See id. at 60 (discussing public perceptions that paupers were poor due to their
2nasty characteristics").
201 Id.
202 Id. at 48.
203 Id. at 64.
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used their discretionary powers primarily to impose sanctions on poor
and immigrant children."20 According to Feld, progressive reformers,
generally elite and industrial middle-class, native-born Americans, re-
sponded to the nineteenth-century social changes of urbanization and
immigration with social control measures that distinguished between
"middle-class children like their own and... 'other people's chil-
dren.'"' 25 Not surprisingly, poor immigrant children, viewed as ge-
netically inferior and predisposed to vice, disproportionately popu-
lated the juvenile courts. 16 The juvenile courts, designed to reform
and rehabilitate children whose behaviors placed them outside the
norms of middle-class society, asserted their hold and "prevailed most
easily over lower-class, immigrant youths and their parents."2 7
Feld notes that "[f]rom the early nineteenth century to the pres-
ent, the juvenile justice system has systematically singled out lower-
class children for punishment and ignored middle- and upper-class
youth," ordering more lenient treatment to children like the judges'
own and sending "foreign" or "alien" youth to institutions.2' s The cur-
rent overrepresentation of minority, particularly black, youth in the
juvenile courts and the disproportionate confinement of minority
youth in juvenile facilities may arguably be an extension of this proc-
ess. Whereas "the disproportionate number of [European] immi-
grants involved in crime [including juvenile crime] moderated as
[they] ... were assimilated into American culture, things were always
different for African-Americans .... [They] were never assimilated in
the ways primarily European whites had been." In contrast, African-
American youth, particularly males living in poor urban areas, remain
"the ultimate out-group."10
Research examining disproportionate minority involvement in the
juvenile justice system reveals gross overrepresentation of young black
males. "In 1996, black juveniles were referred to juvenile court at a
FELD, supra note 16, at 56.
205 Id. at 73.
20 See id. at 65 (arguing that because these poor immigrant children dispropor-
tionately populated the juvenile courts, the juvenile court's status jurisdiction provided
for paternalistic intervention for vulnerable girls).
07 Id.
200 Id. at 73.
209 MILLER, supra note 19, at 51.
210 Paul Butler, Affirmative Action and the Criminal Law, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 841, 869
(1997) (noting race-consciousness in the criminal justice system that disfavors "the ul-
timate out-group in the United States-African Americans").
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rate more than double that for whites."21' From 1987 through 1996,
"the person offense case rate for black juveniles was more than three
times the rates for white juveniles" and the "property offense case
212rate" for black juveniles was double that for white juveniles. Dispari-
ties similar to those in intake and referral are observed in the rate of
detention and confinement for black youth. "Secure detention was
nearly twice as likely in 1996 for cases involving black youth as for
cases involving whites, even after controlling for [one of the factors
used to determine appropriateness of detention and seriousness of
the] offense."2 11 Some argue that these disparities can be accounted
for by disparities in the rates of offenses; however, research reveals
that such disparities are not so easily explained.2 4 In a 1987 study, so-
ciologist Barry Krisberg found no support for the hypothesis that dif-
ferences in incarceration rates among racial groups can be explained
by differences in the types of offense behavior committed.2 5 Instead,
rhetoric about young black "thugs," broadcast widely in the media and
implanted in the psyche of the general public, may play a role in ex-
plaining their disproportionate representation in the juvenile justice
system.16 As Professor Feld notes, the increasingly disproportionate
representation of black youth may be a "graphic illustration of the
conversion of public fear of and hostility toward other people's chil-
dren into harsh and punitive social control practices."
21
21 NATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 150.
212 Id. at 151.
213 Id. at 154.
214 See Howard N. Snyder, The Juvenile Court and Delinquency Cases, FUTURE OF
CHILDREN, Winter 1996, at 58, 59-60 (citing statistics concerning the rates of offenses).
215 KRISBERG & AUSIN, supra note 42, at 120 (noting that Krisberg's conclusions
were similar to those of a 1987 study by Huizinga and Elliot).
216 See MILLER, supra note 19, at 149-50 (noting that images of Mrican-American
youth as criminals that are "hammered home nightly on the IV news and exploitive
crime shows" reinforce the myth of "dark-skinned predators").
217 FELD, supra note 16, at 837. The examples that I provide in this Comment are
of sensational juvenile crimes, notably school killings, that due to their shocking na-
ture tend to be extremely powerful in influencing public perception about crime. Us-
ing these sensational crimes as examples of incidents that give the appearance of an
overall crime epidemic may inappropriately suggest that middle-class or even privi-
leged white youth are the primary targets of punitive juvenile justice reform. Statistics
reflect, however, that poor minority youth continue to disproportionately bear the
burden of punitive juvenile criminal policies. White offenders, however, once they
commit heinous sensational crimes that mobilize "get tough" reformers, are also re-
garded as "other people's children." See 145 CONG. REc. H4350, 4351 (daily ed. June
16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Dreir of California) (noting that "[o ] ur children are not
reflected in the twisted rage of Columbine's killers").
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IV. TOWARDS A BALANCED APPROACH TOJUSTICE FORJUVENILES
According to Bernard, given the cyclical nature ofjuvenile crime,
no solution to the problem will be derived from merely "introducing a
new juvenile justice policy."2 1 8 One way out of the cycle, however, is
the creation of an entirely new model of juvenile justice. This Part
briefly presents the core tenets of a restorative justice philosophy and
the BARJ model as tailored to address juvenile delinquency.
As an alternative to the present system of retributive justice, which
focuses primarily on punishment for past deeds and not on future
needs for either the offender or his or her victims, restorative justice
focuses on the restoration of relationships as well as individual and social
healing... Under such guidelines the aim ofjustice is to meet needs
and promote healing of (a) victims, (b) the community, (c) offenders,
and (d) relationships between them. In a restorative system of justice,
there is a recognition that violations create obligations and these obliga-
tions are bilateral-the offender must acknowledge and take responsibil-
ity for the harm done to victims and communities, and society acknowl-
edges a responsibility to both victims and offenders.2
9
According to Professor Howard Zehr, the current legal system, in
framing crime as "harm to the state, not to people" ignores harm to
people, communities and the relationships between them.220 A re-
storative system ofjustice instead promotes the recognition that crime
violates people and the relationships between them and places em-
phasis on addressing that rupture by involving central figures includ-
ing the victim and, often, other community members.
A balanced approach to combating juvenile crime that incorpo-
rates both offender- and offense-focused factors in accountability,
public safety, and competency development appears to deliver appro-
priate consequences for delinquent conduct while maintaining a fo-
cus on long-term objectives for offenders.22' As such, the principles of
both the restorative system of justice and the balanced approach
would provide an ideal resolution to what Professor Feld describes as
218 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 186.
219 SANDRA L. BLOOM & MICHAEL REICHERT, BEARING WITNESS: VIOLENCE AND
COLLECrIVE RESPONSIBILTY 269 (1998).
220 Weekend Edition Sunday: Use of RestorativeJusticeAs an Alternative Sentencing Method
for Offenders and To Allow Victims Some Peace of Mind (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 10,
1999) (transcript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (discussing the
notion of restorative justice in the American juvenile justice system) [hereinafter Week-
end Sunday Edition].
221 See supra Part ll.A.3 (noting how certain states have incorporated a balanced
approach in theirjuvenilejustice statutes).
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"the legal dichotom[y] and contradictory polic[y] inherent
in... [the] binary formulation... either punishment or treat-
ment."222 The balanced approach improves the current system by in-
corporating restorative justice principles while preserving the original
intent of those who devised a separate system for children-to safe-
guard the rights of children who merit treatment and rehabilitation
over pure punishment and incarceration.
BARJ is a program adapted from an adult rehabilitation model
that balances the need for offender accountability to the victim and
the community, the need to provide public safety, and the system's
goal of helping youth to become competent, contributing members of
society. It has at its core the tenets of restorative justice, which hold
that "when a crime is committed the offender incurs an obligation to
restore the victim-and by extension the community-to the state of
well-being that existed before the offense."2 The three prongs of the
balanced approach, particularly in the area of restitution and ac-
countability, work well within a restorative system of justice. With re-
gard to accountability, programs such as victim-offender mediations,
victim restitution, and community service have been successfully em-
ployed. They strive to develop in the offender a sensitivity to his or
her victim and an ability to see how the consequences of his or her ac-
tions have ruptured or harmed the community. Public safety con-
cerns may be met through residential confinement or placement in
supervised day programs that address other rehabilitative needs. Fi-
nally, competency development integrates education, work, and social
skills that assist juvenile offenders in establishing a positive sense of
themselves. In practice, this might involve use of classroom programs
or even community mentors to replace the lack of positive role mod-
els in the lives of many young offenders. The strength of the BARJ
model is that it comprehensively addresses the stated goals of the
original juvenile justice system while balancing in a feasible way treat-
ment and punishment needs tailored to the goals of long-term re-
form.
22 4
SFELD, supra note 16, at 290.
23 Peter Freivalds, OJ]DP Fact Sheet #42: Balanced and RestorativeJustice Project (BAR)
(visitedJan. 16, 2000) <http://ncjrs.org/txtfiles/91415.txt>.
24 See generally Jennifer Michelle Cunha, Family Group Conferences: Healing the
Wounds ofJuvenile Property Crime in New Zealand and the United States, 13 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 283, 287-88 (1999) (examining use of restorative justice model in dealing with
juvenile offenses). Cunha notes that the restorative justice model "[r]ather than forc-
ing the parties to engage in a contest of legal sparring... attempts to bring them to-
gether and encourage[s] a unanimous and mutually beneficial solution." Id. at 286; see
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An additional component comprised in the balanced approach
and restorative justice model is a focus on the role of educational and
vocational programs and other activities in promoting pro-social op-
portunities for success and long-term competencies. Evidence from
research with serious violent juvenile delinquents suggests that they
have poor interpersonal skills and therefore may tend to be social iso-
lates with very restricted social networks.2 In assessing the role of so-
cial relationships, researchers find that the more enmeshed one is in a
wide social network, the lower the delinquency and general tendency
to deviate from society's norms. "[I] t is not so much a matter of
whether a youth lives in a ghetto or has unemployed parents, but
rather how well that youth is worked into the social network of a soci-
ety."22 Since social networks, including family, community, school,
work, and peers are believed to play a protective role in diminishing
or preventing delinquency, a balanced and restorative justice ap-
proach would seem effective in that it invites a wide network of social
relationships to participate in integrating the offending youth back
into the communities.27 In a restorative justice and balanced ap-
proach model, the need for treatment is not eclipsed by a need for
punishment, and swift, consistent, but appropriate consequences to
address the actions of serious juvenile offenders are combined with
appropriate competency development. As Bernard warns, a juvenile
reform approach that fails to balance punishment with treatment
needs risks perpetuating the cycle ofjuvenile crime.228
Professor Feld argues that the juvenile court has failed "because of
the inherent contradiction in [its] ... two missions," that of delivering
also Amanda L. Paye, Communities Take Control of Crime: Incorporating the Conferencing
Model into the United States Juvenile Justice System, 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 161 (1999)
(analyzing restorative justice principles as alternatives to the retributive philosophy of
the currentjuvenile justice system); Freivalds, supra note 223 (providing basic informa-
tion about BARJ); Weekend Edition Sunday, supra note 220 (discussing the notion of re-
storative justice in the Americanjustice system).
See HEIDE, supra note 17, at 46-48 (noting personality characteristics ofjuvenile
delinquents).
226 CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY. A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 290 (1989).
227 See Weekend Edition. Sunday, supra note 220 (discussing the wide network of fam-
ily, community, and legal personnel who took part in the restorative justice peace cir-
cle to address juvenile delinquents' behavior).
228 See supra Part IU.A (discussing the cycle ofjuvenile crime). Bernard, however,
might argue that the balanced approach is another form of lenient treatment that sets
the stage for a corresponding punitive response in the future. See BERNARD, supra note
8, at 3-9.
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social welfare services and providing criminal social control. Inte-
grating the juvenile court into adult criminal court as he recom-
mends, however, may invite the same problems of reconciling chil-
dren's welfare needs with crime control, since children are (and will
always be) different... While he proposes uncoupling these two func-
tions by integrating the juvenile court into the adult system and em-
ploying a youth discount in sentencing juveniles in adult court, it is
quite possible that we would instead witness an amplification of the
worst features of both the juvenile and adult systems. Instead of being
warehoused in juvenile settings, young children who would face no
other option but to be tried in already overwhelmed adult courts
might simply be warehoused in adult facilities where they face a
known risk of harm.2'
There is a shortage of therapeutic interventions, educational re-
sources, life skills, and social skills competency development for all
children growing up in poor, crime-ridden communities. Moreover,
due to the external risk factors that impinge upon healthy child and
adolescent development and the fact that these risks have done little
more than flourish in the 100 years since the inception of the juvenile
court, the need for treatment and rehabilitation appears even greater
now than ever before. Once detained and incarcerated, either as ju-
veniles or as adults, they risk lagging farther behind educationally,
emotionally, and developmentally, and are likely to lose permanently
any semblance of a normal childhood. 2 Bernard notes that the most
promising avenue in the search for a solution to juvenile crime does
not lie in tailoring treatment interventions for specific rehabilitative
aims, as that would tend to perpetuate the cycle by introducing addi-
tional policies, but in targeting "the larger social conditions that
[give] rise to [juvenile crime] ... in the first place."2 3 "The correct
response to the question, 'What works?' is to reframe it as, 'What
works, for which youths, in whose hands, under what conditions, and
FELD, supra note 16, at 289.
2o SeeYellen, supra note 14, at 996-97 (noting that there are significant and endur-
ing differences between children and adults).
231 See Children's Defense Fund, supra note 132 (critiquing the holding ofjuveniles
in adult facilities).
232 See Morse, supra note 151, at 65 (noting that "[r]eformatories and pris-
ons ... are hardly the type of environments that provide firm but caring discipline or
the graded freedom and responsibilities that give [children and] adolescents the best
chance to develop mature, good reason").
233 BERNARD, supra note 8, at 186.
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in what way?' The simple answer 'Nothing' is not acceptable.' 23
The Johnson administration's effort to eliminate poverty in the
context of the debate on juvenile crime led James Sundquist, a mem-
ber of the national task force to address poverty in America, to ask:
"In the war on poverty, as in the war on youth crime, was the target
the individual or the community?"m The problem Sundquist identi-
fied over thirty years ago looms larger today, as the relationships
among many social variables influencing juvenile crime have now be-
come clearer. s6 As a result, the question remains whether the juvenile
justice system should aim to change the individual offender or to
tackle the larger, more onerous and costly task of altering the perni-
cious environment.
Individualized justice, or treating young offenders on a case-by-
case basis only after they have committed a crime, may serve to deflect
attention away from the root causes of juvenile crime. This may be
the case whether the juvenile is treated benevolently for rehabilitative
and treatment purposes or harshly for retributive or punitive aims or
even through a more balanced approach. Moreover, interventions
that focus solely on the youth offender may offer limited solutions.
They may, thus, fail to achieve the broader impact of a shattering and
remaking of youth culture in America. Through shortsighted punitive
measures that have the effect of simply warehousing young offenders,
we may appear to be winning the battle.s 7 Yet if we continue to treat
juvenile offenders as refuse to be ignored, carted away and locked up
without ameliorating the blighted and dangerous communities from
which they came, we will surely lose the war.
CONCLUSION
The problem ofjuvenile delinquency, like most social ills, is com-
plex and multilayered. What is needed for reasoned and effective in-
terventions is accurate reporting of the nature of the problem and a
2M NURcOMBE & PARTLETr, supra note 72, at 305.
2s5 Adler, supra note 167, at 552-53 (quotingJAMES L. SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND
POLICY: THEEISENHOWER, KENNEDYANDJOHNSONYEARS 152 (1968)).
= See supra part lIT.G (discussing PresidentJohnson's war on poverty and efforts to
combat crime).
237 The above statement appears true if the battle is defined solely as one of an
immediate reduction of crime. Empirical data, however, suggests that extremely puni-
tive measures, like incarceration or detention, are only minimally effective in deterring
crime. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 17, at 5 (noting the effectiveness of community-
based restitution programs over retributive approaches).
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full understanding of the many interrelated risk factors that leave a
population of children vulnerable to acting out in criminal ways. As
the juvenile court marks its 100th anniversary, "get tough on crime"
rhetoric has prompted reformers to enact legislation that threatens to
replace the juvenile court as a forum for dealing with juvenile delin-
quents with an adult criminal counterpart. Policies including lower-
ing the minimum age of adult criminal prosecution to prohibiting the
expungement of juvenile records threaten to constructively dismantle
this institution that has protected young offenders, albeit not entirely,
who do not merit harsh adult punishments. New reforms should re-
flect the original intent of the juvenile court-rehabilitation and re-
form-which, according to social science research, is more effective
than pure punishment. As Thomas Bernard's cyclical model of juve-
nile justice would suggest, however, replacing old policies for new
ones simply perpetuates a cycle of punishment and leniency. What we
need is not to better the mousetrap, but to reconceptualize it. The phi-
losophy of restorative justice and BARJ principles may serve this end,
but only when they truly balance equally between public safety, ac-
countability, and competency development for young offenders.
Given the power of rhetoric and the strong desire to punish, legis-
lative restraint and public compassion, especially for those long
viewed as "other people's children," will be necessary to refrain the
advancement of even harsher juvenile bills, or the dismantling of the
system entirely if or when it does not appear to deliver what it prom-
ises. Public hysteria and stereotypes will never produce effective and
fair juvenile justice policy. Fundamentally, what is most needed is
recognition that we all have a personal stake in finding the solution to
youth crime and recognition that as a nation, we all stand to profit or
pay for what becomes of our children. Without this realization, we are
doomed to repeat flawed juvenile justice policies time and again while
ignoring promising opportunities for the next generation.
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